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ABSTRACT

Peldon, Deki. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, Wright State
University, 2018. How Nationalism and Regional Influence Affected the Political Transitions of
Bhutan and Nepal
Democracy is facing crisis as its values including political rights and civil liberties are declining
around the world. If democracy is to prevail, the reasons for the decline need to be addressed. To this end,
the research question is: how nationalism and regional influences affect the political transitions of Bhutan
and Nepal. The research question is answered by analyzing leadership stability, ethnicity and the caste
system, as well as the roles of regional giants India and China in Bhutan’s and Nepal’s political transitions.
The findings show that the contested conceptions of nationalism in Nepal and strong internal nationalism
in Bhutan explain much of the varying nature of the transitions. In addition, regional influence, especially
the significant role exerted by India in both cases, help explain the differences in the political transitions of
Bhutan and Nepal.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Political transitions in Bhutan and Nepal

I. Introduction:
In this thesis, I examine why some political transitions, especially transitions to democracy,
are more successful than others. In order to examine this important question, I study the cases of
Bhutan and Nepal, focusing on their democratic transitions since 2008. Specifically, I will examine
the impacts of nationalism and regional influences and the degree to which they impact the role of
violence in these important transitions.
The internationally recognized non-governmental organization (NGO), Freedom House
marks 2008 as the year when global freedom suffered its third year of decline, a decline that
continues through 2018 (Freedom House, 2008 and Freedom House, 2018). Although 121
countries had achieved some level of consolidated democracy by 2008, many other countries were
still struggling in a transitional stage (Freedom House, 2008). Countries such as Nigeria,
Zimbabwe, Italy, Greece, and others were experiencing democratic deterioration in 2008 (Lim,
2010: 180). Concurrent with these struggles for democracy, both Bhutan and Nepal, were just
beginning to adopt democracy in 2008.
According to scholars, a successful democratic transition requires strategic patience,
prolonged negotiation between the emerging opposition and the upper ranks of the former regime,
and courageous actions by both leaders and the people (Basora, 2016: 1). In addition, Diamond
also makes it clear that successful democratization involves a long, difficult and non-linear process
(1999: 65). Similarly, scholars such as Rustow, Diamond and others have listed various criteria
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for a successful democratic transition. Diamond contends that the chances of sustaining democracy
increase with economic development, such as improvement in levels of education, and per capita
income, rather than aggregate economic growth alone (2009:1). Democracy is quite difficult to
adopt. Transitions take time and involve at least some level of uncertainty and instability.
Scholars have long conceptualized the meanings of democracy. To Rousseau, democracy is
a social contract in which an individual becomes a part of an association, which will defend and
protect each member, and each member in return will unite with others to express “general will”
while remaining as free as before (1762: 2002: 11). In contrast, Schumpeter defines democracy as
a system where those who command more support than the competing individual or teams get to
reign the government (1976: 250). Przeworski, diversifying from Schumpeter, defines democracy
as the possibility of being able to change governments in a non-violent fashion, by voting (2003:
13). O’Donnell and Schmitter view democracy as a system with at least minimal procedures such
as a secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, and executive
accountability (1993: 8). In this thesis, I conceptualize democracy as a system in which citizens
are able to express and exercise their general will freely through procedures including voting,
freedom of expression, and the rule of law.
Political scientists have engaged in vigorous debates about what "causes" democratization
and what is necessary for a successful democratic transition. Modernization theorists including
Lipset believe that democracy is related to the state of economic development (1959:75). Lipset
further believes that the more economically developed a nation is, the more sustainable their
democracy will be. If a nation is economically developed (beyond high economic growth), it can
mean that the nation has a strong education system, health care facilities and more equality. To
Lipset, these factors make democracy easier to attain and to sustain. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and
2

Stephens contend that economic development is related to democracy because it shifts the balance
of class power by weakening the power of the landlord class and by strengthening the subordinate
classes (1993:73). The capacity for self- organization (an important aspect of democracy) improves
due to changes including urbanization, factory production, communication, and transportation
(1993: 73). Huntington identifies five factors to account for his perceived “third wave” of
democracy in the late twentieth century: legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments; rising
expectations especially by the middle class; liberalization within the Roman Catholic Church;
advocacy of democracy by multilateral organizations and the USA; and the demonstration effect
of democratizing nations (1991:13). For Rustow, both economic (per capita income) and social
factors (literacy, the need for beliefs among citizens and preexisting “social and political
structure”) are helpful for a successful democratic transition (1970: 337 – 338).
According to Rustow, the conditions that make democracy possible include the ability to
connect a stable democracy to certain economic and social background conditions. The conditions
include per capita income, widespread literacy and prevalent urban residence (1970: 337); "the
need for beliefs or certain psychological attitudes among citizens;" (p. 337) and the need for certain
preexisting "social and political structure" (p. 338). Yet, while Rustow viewed these as helpful, he
was careful to argue against the need for any pre-conditions. To him, national unity was the most
important. Gill and Grugel believe that the presence of civil society is imperative for a democratic
transition to take place (Turner, Chuki & Tshering, 2011: 186). Im says economic crises lead to
democracy, whereas Almond and Verba emphasize the development of civic culture (Turner,
Chuki & Tshering, 2011: 186). Similarly, Bollen and Jackman looked to the British experience of
colonization as a factor in promoting successful democratization (1985).
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In the Asian context, studies conducted on democratization have highlighted the role of
popular mobilization and elite factors. According to Lee, political protest, in the form of boycotts,
demonstrations and strikes, is the defining element of Asian democratization (2011:192).
Similarly, Bithar and Lowenthal give huge credit to the essential traits of leaders for a successful
democratic transition (2016: 2). These traits include leaders’ sense of direction; an ability to bond
with citizens; inclusiveness and coalition building; courage; patience and tenacity; self-confidence;
communication skills; and the ability to attract external support when needed (Bithar and
Lowenthal, 2016: 2).
Because of their disruptive nature, many have studied the role of violence in democratic
transitions. According to Paul Collier, political violence can occur due to two reasons: lack of
accountability and low legitimacy. In the former case, if the regime is not able to deliver
performances as expected by the general public, this leads to grievances that might resort to
violence (2009: 18). A legitimate government has a clear sense of tasks they would do, such as
improve the economy or infrastructures, and this entitles it to face down the opposition. But when
the government is not able to fulfill such tasks, they seem illegitimate and this provides a reason
for political violence (p.19). Bermeo claims that high levels of popular mobilization do not always
lead to democratic transitions (1997: 314). She contends that extremist demands and high levels
of mobilization in civil society often occur amidst democratic transitions which can also lead to
violence (Bermeo: 316).
Similarly, Charney believes that businesses helped the South African transition by creating
and running institutions to curb political violence (1999: 182). He further believes that there are
implications from the South African transition that could be helpful for understanding other
transitions. Businesses serve as stabilizing agents when states cannot fulfill their normal public
4

function of regulating social conflict (1999: 183). For instance, in 1989, business management's
threats of closing factories in Mpumalanga and in Natal brought the concerned parties to the
bargaining table. In a sense, the South African businesses took up the role of an intermediator in
order to cease violence.
Similar to Bermeo, Roberts believes that political leaders exist at the top of a pyramidal
structure of relationships (2002: 525). At the base of that pyramid are the people who support the
elites who in return, reward the base (2002: 525). Violence often occurs when this relationship is
challenged (2002: 525). Mansfield and Synder believe that a lack of institutional capacity to sustain
democratic politics increases the risk of international and civil war in countries (2009: 381).
To some, nationalism is a key causal mechanism, in addition to factionalism and foreign
scapegoating, which links incomplete democratization to conflict (Mansfield and Synder, 2009:
382). What happens, according to them, is that in an incomplete democracy with weak institutions,
the desire to expand their political participation often spurs nationalism in ethnic minorities (2009:
384). At the same time, ethnic or statist nationalism of dominant groups might also intensify
because they want to regain their control (2009: 384). That is the point where the conflict starts.
Hoglund, too, believes that the overall objective of electoral violence is to influence the electoral
process (2009: 415). In addition, he claims that most internationally sponsored peace agreements
today revolve around holding free and fair elections (Hoglund: 414).
Although nationalism is a widely employed concept, its meaning differs. According to
Gellner, nationalism is a) a political consciousness shared by a set of people who also share a
similar national interest; b) a political ideology which considers the nation as the main determinant
of a nation-state; c) a preference for the protection of interests of the members of a nation over the
interests of ethnic groups; and d) an overestimation of the characteristics of one nation or ethnic
5

country at the expense of other nations or ethnicities which can lead to intolerance and ethnic
conflicts (1997: 5). Nationalism evolved as an expression of aspirations for those who wished to
achieve national independence, freedom, and sovereignty in the 18th and 19th century and it became
stronger during anti-colonial movements around the world (Llunji, 2014: 55). For instance, in
Kosovo, the Yugoslav federation suppressed nationalist sentiments for a long period of time
stirring collective frustration among people in Kosovo (Llunji: 57). This factor, in addition to
others (such as ethnic tensions and authoritarianism), led to an explosion of nationalism in Kosovo
(Llunji: 58).
Jack Snyder believes that the connection between democratization and conflicts are often
fueled by nationalism (2000: 27). He argues that generally, during the early stages of
democratization, popular nationalism (which tends to be weak among the masses) typically arises
because elites exploit this nationalism approach for their own benefit (Snyder: 32).
Although there is an emotional and psychological factor associated with nationalism which
makes it difficult to quantify, I draw on Webster (1995), by adopting his key expressions of
nationalism, and apply them to my respective cases. Some of the key expressions of nationalism
that I will be looking into are: laws and policies concerning citizenship and loyalty, the use of
language and the use of surnames; and the importance of caste and ethnic identities.
In addition to nationalism, regional influences may impact the nature of transitions.
According to Pevehouse, democracy is often viewed as a domestic political process which is not
influenced by actors outside of the nation-state (2002: 515). Yet, Pevehouse claims that the
promotion of democracy has become a foreign policy goal for many existing democracies and
International Governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), European Union, among others (516). For example, in the 1980s, the European
6

Community (EC) played a key role in consolidating democracies in southern Europe (Huntington,
1991: 14). In countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the EC played a significant role in
making sure these countries not only transition into democracy but sustain it (Huntington: 14).
These countries adopted democracy in order to secure the economic benefits of EC membership.
The EC influenced these countries in order to live up to its status as a “guarantor of the stability of
democracy” (Huntington: 14). Some of the potential causal mechanisms that might have either
served as external guarantor or threats are: diplomatic and economic pressure from outside; and
social elites and their roles in the transitions (525). I will use these potential causal mechanisms
and see if regional powers, including India and China, used such tools to influence Bhutan and
Nepal’s transitions to democracy.
II.

Historical Overview:
i.

Bhutan:

Bhutan has almost 1400 years of history. In the 1640s, Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel
created the “Dual System” where the religious and the spiritual aspects of the country were handled
by the Zhabdrung himself and the political aspect was handled by the Desi, a secular ruler
designated by the Zhabdrung (Phuntsho, 2008: 227). Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel is credited
with unifying Bhutan and creating the "Bhutanese identity" that remains present to this day
(Mathou, 2009:229). The Desi appointed Penlops (provincial governors) who further appointed
Dzongpoens (lord of the dzong) as sub-district authorities (Mathou, 2009:229). Penlops would
fight the Desi for power or among themselves for more territory. The same applied to Dzongpoens.
Bhutan was under the autocratic rule of the Wangchuck Dynasty since 1907. Prior to 1907,
there were many power structures in Bhutan which were consumed by infighting. Bhutan had
various experiences of a democratic system in the past under the monarchial system of Bhutan.
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The third King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, established the parliamentary body, known as the
National Assembly, in 1953, instituting a consultative and a law-making body (Chhoden, 2009:
3). It was then followed with the establishment of the judicial system in 1960 and the Royal
Advisory Council in 1968 (Chhoden, 2009: 3). Furthermore, the third king of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji
Wangchuck, passed a royal decree in 1968 which vested the National Assembly with institutional
sovereignty and the power to remove the king through a vote of no-confidence (based on a twothirds majority) (Bothe, 2015). This decree came into force in 1969 (Bothe, 2015). In a
continuation of the process of decentralization, the District Development Committee (DDC) and
Block Development Committee (BDC) were introduced in 1981 and 1991, respectively (Chhoden,
2009: 3). These institutions were established in order to transfer the responsibility for planning,
financing, and managing certain public functions from the central government to district level
(DDC) and further, to the most local, block level (BDC). On September 4, 2001, the King issued
a Royal Decree commanding the drafting of a constitution which became another bold step by the
King on the path to democratization (Turner & Tshering, 2014: 197).
The fourth king of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, instituted more significant changes.
He dissolved the former council of ministers in 1998 and announced that ministers formerly
appointed by him would instead be approved by the National Assembly via votes (Bothe, 2015).
Similarly, in 1998, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck reduced his role to being head of the state
alone, calling for the election of a prime minister as the head of the government (Bothe, 2015).
The post of the prime minister was selected annually from among the cabinet ministers who were
elected by the National Assembly (Bothe, 2015). Power sharing, even in a rudimentary form, was
present in Bhutan long before institutional democracy was adopted. Traces of democracy may
have existed even when Bhutan was an absolute monarchy. These traces could be seen in events
8

such as the formation of a parliamentary system by the third king, vesting the parliament with the
power to remove the King if need be, decentralizing power from the central government to national
and sub-national levels, and the election of ministers in 1998. Bhutan was experimenting with
democracy even when it was not a democratic state. Democracy in Bhutan was a top-downapproach. Bhutan's democratic journey began from the palace. "Democracy is a gift from the
golden throne," says most Bhutanese (Phunstho, 2008). When there was reluctance from the people
for change, the fourth king insisted on establishing a democratic system (Phunstho, 2008).
Bhutan has three broad ethnic groups: The Ngalop in the West, of Tibetan origin; the
Sharchop in the East, of Indo- Mongoloid origin; and the Lhotshampas in the South, believed to
be of Nepalese origin (Hutt: 399, 1996). The idea of Bhutanese nationalism was first introduced
by Zhhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel in the 1600s when he devised Bhutanese customs, traditions
and ceremonies in order to develop a unique cultural identity for Bhutan (Mathou, 2009: 229).
This idea was further expanded by the government of Bhutan which came up with various
programs since the 1980s. For instance, in 1980, the government introduced the Marriage Act,
which restricted marriage with non-Bhutanese (Hutt: 410). In addition, in 1985, the Citizenship
Act was introduced, which allowed citizenship to one whose both parents were born in Bhutan
(Hutt: 401). If a Bhutanese married a non-Bhutanese, in order to achieve citizenship, the nonBhutanese should have at least 15 years of residency, as well as be able to speak, write and read
Dzongkha, the national language of Bhutan since 1979 (Hutt: 410). Furthermore, the policy of
Driglam Namzha (national customs and etiquette) was brought to light during Bhutan's Sixth Five
Year Plan (1987-92) (Hutt: 403). It included a policy of “one nation one people” and made it
mandatory for all to adhere to traditional Bhutanese dress (Gho for men and Kira for women) and

9

etiquette (Hutt: 403). These policies were introduced in order to create and preserve cultural
identity and to bolster Bhutanese nationalism.
Regionally, Bhutan has a very strong bilateral relationship with India. This relationship
started with the signing of the 1949 treaty of India-Bhutan Friendship (Indian Embassy: Bhutan,
2017). According to the treaty, India will “guide” Bhutan on its foreign and defense policies. The
treaty was revised again in 2007, when the two sides agreed to “cooperate with each other on issues
relating to their national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for
activities harmful to the national security and the interest of the other” (“Why is Bhutan special to
India”, 2017). By 1968, India had appointed a resident representative in Bhutan which was taken
as a sign of strengthening friendship between the two countries (Indian Embassy: Bhutan, 2017).
In addition, India is Bhutan’s largest trading partner since 1972 and, during Bhutan’s 11th Five
Year Plan (2013-18), India committed to supporting Bhutan with 4500 Million Rupees (Indian
Embassy: Bhutan: 2017). These points demonstrate an influential relationship between India and
Bhutan. Although Bhutan has diplomatic relations with 52 states, India is its closest ally (Foreign
Ministry of Bhutan, 2017). Bhutan and China lack diplomatic ties. They have engaged in almost
19 rounds of high-level talks regarding a border dispute where China was accused to constructing
roads in Bhutanese territory, and India sent its troops into the disputed area in order to help Bhutan
(“Why is Bhutan special to India”, 2017).
Nepal:
Nepal was under the leadership of a monarchical family, the Shah Dynasty, for almost 265
years (16th century to 21st century) (Parajulee, 2000). Nepal attempted to transition to democracy
when it was under the autocratic rule of the Shah Dynasty. The first ruler of the dynasty, Prithvi
Narayan Shah is credited with unifying Nepal and creating a nation-state in the 1700s (Osmani
10

and Bajracharya, 2007). Prior of the 1700s, Nepal was divided into more than 50 principalities and
Prithvi Narayan Shah was the ruler of Gorkha, a principality (Osmani and Bajracharya, 2007).
Prithvi Narayan Shah brought all the principalities together and became the first King of Nepal.
Nepal’s journey to democracy, unlike Bhutan’s was a bottom-up approach and can be divided
into four phases. Nepal’s first transition took place from 1950 to 1959, when King Tribhuvan fled
to India when Ranas (who were a hereditary family of Prime Ministers of Nepal from 1846 – 1951)
became a perceived threat to the king (Kantha, 2008: 62). The Delhi Agreement of 1951, which
was a negotiation between the king, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress, decided that a democratic
system would be established by an elected Constituent Assembly (Kantha, 2008: 62). It did not
work out well because the traditional elites, including the King, violated the Delhi Agreement, and
further, it was poorly implemented. King Tribhuvan died in 1955 and was succeeded by his son
Mahendra. In violation of the Delhi Agreement, although Nepal held its first general election in
1959 (in which the Nepali Congress Party won), by late 1960, the king had the cabinet arrested
and seized power for himself (Parajulee, 2000).
The next transition took place from 1979 to 1981, during a time of growing turbulence
against King Birendra after he had tried to centralize the system, hereby alienating the opposition
(Osmani and Bajracharya, 2007). A referendum was held in 1980 which was ordered by King
Birendra on May 24, 1979 (Osmani and Bajracharya, 2007). The referendum was on whether the
Nepali public wanted to continue with the party-less Panchayat System or to opt for a multi-party
system (Osmani and Bajracharya, 2007). The no-party system which was favored by the King
secured victory in the referendum with 55% votes (Kantha, 2008: 64). From 1979 to 1981, political
parties functioned even without any legal recognition and the press was unrestrained too (Kantha,
2008: 64).
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The third transition took place from 1990 to 1991 when there was a movement for the
restoration of democracy by the Nepali Congress (Kantha, 2008: 64). The fourth transition then
took place in 2008. Nepal had tried to transform to democracy a couple of times before they
completed it in 2008, but it was driven by rupture and conflict between King Gyanendra and
Nepal's parliamentary parties (Parajulee, 2000).
Nepal has long struggled to create a formal constitution (Kantha, 2013). In 2012, Nepal was
still using the interim constitution that was drafted by the Constituent Assembly in 2007 (Kantha,
2013). In addition, on May 27, 2012, the Constituent Assembly of Nepal was dissolved, leaving
the country without any proper parliament (Kantha, 2013). Political parties were often fighting.
As an illustration, when there was a debate on the fashioning of Nepal’s federal system (in 2012),
people were split into two camps. For example, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist wanted weak federalism whereas Madhesis (who are considered low caste)
demanded ethnic-based federalism with an autonomous Madhesis province (Parajulee, 2000).
With regards to the diversity within society, Nepal is approximately 86% Hindu and although
it does not establish Hinduism as the state religion, it is the only official Hindu state in the world
(CIA World Factbook: Nepal, 2017). According to the latest estimates (2011), Nepal has almost
125 ethnic groups including Newars, Indians, Tibetans, Gurungs, Magars, Tamangs, Bhitias, Rais,
Limbus, Sherpas (CIA World Factbook, 2017).
Regionally, Nepal’s relations are dominated by a bitter relationship with India. On one hand,
they signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950 and India has been providing Nepal with
substantial financial and technical development assistance since 1951 (Indian Embassy: Nepal,
2017). For instance, the total economic assistance from India under the tag, "Aid to Nepal" budget
for FY 2016-17 was 300 Million Rupees (2017). On the other hand, India and Nepal have
12

significant disputes over a region, the source of Kalapani River (which is almost 400 Square Km).
According to the Saguali Treaty which was signed between Nepal and British-India on 4 March,
1816, Kali river belongs to Nepal (CIA World Factbook, 2017). Nepal claims that the river to the
west of Kalapani river is the Kali river but insists that east of the Kalapani is the main Kali river
(CIA World Factbook, 2017).
III.

Methodology and Research Design:

Why was Nepal’s transition to democracy marred by violence, while Bhutan’s has been largely
peaceful? There are many variables to analyze this difference.
a) Variables:
Although political scientists have examined various factors that explain democratic
transitions, not all of those factors can be applied in any singular case, and their importance varies.
Factors such as economic crisis, popular mobilization of people for democratic values and
international pressure join multiple other factors to holistically analyze democratic transitions.
Scholars such as Burton, Gunther, and Higley claim that democratic transitions can also take
place when there is an endogenous process of consensus building among elites in regard to rules
and codes of political institutions (Schneider, 2001, 218). In addition, they also state that elites can
come to consensus through either settlement with themselves or through convergence (218). Yet,
it does not seem that democracy in Nepal was not elite-driven. Instead, when people pushed for it
in 1950, 1979 and again in 1990, the king of Nepal tried to suppress them by either ignoring it in
the first place or accepting it but never actually implementing it (Kantha, 2008: 62). In the minds
of many people, such actions by the leaders of Nepal shattered the aura and the mythology that
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kings of Nepal were a reincarnation of Lord Vishnu (“Last Nepal King breaks ancient Taboo”,
2010).
Similarly, other factors that might help explain the difference in the process would be income
level, the presence of young people, adult literacy rate and rule of law. As Lipset has put forward
the importance of economic development as a condition for democracy to work, when it came to
operationalize it, he measured it in terms of wealth and industrialization which was further
measured in terms of per capita income (1959:75). As per the World Bank, the income level of
Nepal was 12.454 Billion USD in comparison to Bhutan's 1.258 Billion USD in 2008. Due to the
huge gap between the GDPs of the two countries, it would not be appropriate to compare the
respective income levels. Furthermore, although Lipset also talked about how education is another
important indicator of democracy (1959:75), the adult literacy rate of both Bhutan and Nepal
cannot be used as a factor. Although according to the Human Development Index, both countries
had a similar level of adult literacy rate in 2008 (Nepal had 52.8% and Bhutan had 57.4%), the
two countries have a huge difference in terms of overall population. For instance, 2017 estimates
show that Bhutan has a population of roughly 0.8 million, whereas Nepal has roughly 29 million
people (The World Factbook). This population gap of 2017 is similar to the gap in 2008. In that
regard, the literacy rates of both countries were also not similar in 2008.
Scholars such as Huntington, Lee and Bitar and Lowenthal have pointed out the importance
of popular mobilization as a defining element of Asian democratization which was mostly carried
out by younger generations. The percentage of young people cannot be used as another indicator
of this study due to the huge difference in total population number. According to UNICEF, the
percentage of young people (aged15 to 24) was 21.86% in Nepal and 19.21% in Bhutan in 2008.
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It will be interesting to see if the presence and absence of popular mobilization in Nepal and Bhutan
had to do with the presence of the young generation in both countries.
Most of the conventional indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, Literacy rate and popular
mobilization seem to not have much explanatory power in the case of the transitions of Nepal and
Bhutan. Factors such as nationalism and regional influences might prove better in explaining the
cases, as I will examine.
Proposed Hypotheses:
a) A stronger sense of statist nationalism in Bhutan explains its peaceful transition whereas
contested conceptions of nationalism in Nepal explains its comparatively violent transition
I will measure nationalism by looking at laws and policies, ethnic and caste identity,
and importance or surnames.
b) A strong and supportive regional influence helped Bhutan have a peaceful democratic
transition whereas a lack of a positive regional influence in Nepal helps explain its
comparatively violent democratic transition. Because of the large influence of India in both
countries, I will closely examine its role.
IV.

Organization:
The four chapters of this thesis will develop an explanation of why Bhutan and Nepal had

violent and non-violent democratic transition post-2008. In Chapter 2, I will examine the role of
nationalism and regional influence in Nepal’s democratic transition after 2008. Chapter 3 studies
the role of nationalism and regional influence in Bhutan’s democratic transition in the same time
period. Chapter 4 reviews the principal findings, considers responses to my arguments, examines
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alternative explanations, and discusses limitations of comparing two similar cases with different
outcomes and offers thoughts for future research.
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Chapter Two:
Nationalism and Regional Influence in Nepal’s Political Transitions
This chapter will look into a brief history of Nepal and will highlight key events that occurred in
Nepal prior 2008 and also after 2008. This chapter also discusses how nationalism and regional
influences have impacted the political transitions in Nepal. In terms of nationalism, factors such
as surnames, caste and ethnic identity will be studied, and the roles of India and China will be
studied to understand their influence in Nepalese transitions. Nepal’s political transitions have
been marred by violence as noted by Shah (2016) and Jha (2016).
Country Profile:
Nepal is a South Asian state of approximately 29 million people (CIA World Factbook,
2018). It is an immensely diverse country in many aspects: geography, ethnicity, language,
religion, and caste. It was born as a nation in 1768 when Prithvi Narayan Shah took control of the
city of Kathmandu and its surrounding principalities and declared a unified state (The Carter
Center, 2009: 21). Prithvi Narayan Shah’s descendants ruled Nepal as hereditary monarchs until
1846, when another family, the Ranas, took absolute power and ruled as hereditary Prime Ministers
for more than a century (The Carter Center, 2009: 21).
The Ranas were toppled in 1951 by a movement which was led by the Nepal Congress
Party (NC) which was supported by then-King Tribhuvan (“Nepal profile – Timeline,” BBC,
2017). In the same year, the Nepali Congress Party and Rana family members agreed to form a
coalition government. In 1959, King Mahendra put forward a new constitution under which a
general election was held, and the NC won with the majority vote and formed the government
(“Nepal profile - Timeline,” BBC, 2017). King Mahendra staged a coup in 1960 and assumed
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direct power by dismissing the Nepali Congress government (The Carter Center, 2009: 21). A new
constitution was put into effect in 1962, according to which, the King was supposed to rule the
country directly (The Carter Center, 2009: 21). This new regime was known as the party-less
system (Panchayat System). In 1990, a people’s movement (Jana Andolan), led by the Nepali
Congress and the United Left Front, erupted against the Panchayat regime (The Carter Center,
2009: 21).
In 1990, King Birendra agreed to dissolve the Panchayat System and a new democratic
constitution was drafted. This system rejected most of the King’s direct powers but still allowed
him to keep his constitutional status and maintain this title (Savada, 1993). The Nepali Congress
Party won the general election of 1991 and Girija Prasad Koirala became the Prime Minister. In
1996, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist began an armed rebellion calling it the “people’s war”
against the government (The Carter Center, 2009: 21). King Birendra was assassinated by the
crown prince Dipendra, who then shot and killed himself, in 2001. Gyanendra, King Birendra's
brother, was crowned the new King of Nepal. In 2002, King Gyanendra dissolved the parliament
and also terminated the Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, who was blamed for not being able
to hold an election (“Nepal profile - Timeline,” BBC, 2017). Afterwards, a series of governments
were formed which were led by Prime Ministers who were chosen personally by the King. In
February 2005, King Gyanendra staged a coup and took direct power. He also expressed his
intention to fight the Maoists. In November of the same year, the Maoists and the major
parliamentary parties came to an agreement on starting a movement to end the direct rule of King
Gyanendra (“Timeline-Milestones in Political History of Nepal,” 2008). Following such extensive
discussion, in April 2006, The Second People’s Movement (Jana Andolan II) took place, which
was advocated by political parties and the Maoists. Due to massive street protests and widespread
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resentment, King Gyanendra stepped down (“Timeline-Milestones in Political History of Nepal,”
2008). Soon after, Girija Prasad Koirala, of the Nepali Congress Party, was appointed the Prime
Minister on 25 April, 2006.
In November of 2006, a peace agreement was signed between the government and the
Maoists which brought an end to the decade-long conflict (1996 – 2006) known as the “People’s
War.” In April, 2007, the Maoists became a part of the interim government which was led by Prime
Minister Koirala. In May of 2007, the Constituent Assembly election was postponed from June to
November due to a lack of adequate preparation for the election.
In September of 2007, the Maoists left the interim government and demanded the
immediate abolition of the monarchy and changes to the electoral law (“Timeline-Milestones in
Political History of Nepal,” 2008). In October, elections were postponed as the Maoists refused to
participate unless their demands were fulfilled. The government negotiated with the Maoists, who
joined the government in December. Elections took place in April 2008, in which the Maoists won
38.2% of the seats, followed by the Nepali Congress with 19.1%, Communist Party of Nepal –
Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) with 18.1% and lastly by Madhesi People's Rights Forum
(MPRF) with 8.8% (The Carter Center, 2009: 22). In May of 2008, the first meeting of the
Constituent Assembly took place and Nepal officially embarked on its path as a federal, democratic
republic (Parakh, 2015).
In July of 2008, Ram Baran Yadav was elected as Nepal’s first president, and Paramanand
Jha as Nepal’s first vice-President. They were both victorious in the presidential run-off held in
the Constituent Assembly where he got 308 votes while the Maoist sponsored candidate, Ram Raja
Prasad Singh got 282 votes (“Timeline-Milestones in Political History of Nepal,” 2008). Both men
are Madhesi minorities, which is a group who has felt they are being discriminated and not
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considered “Nepali”. So, when two of the highest posts were won by candidates belonging to this
minority, it seemed like things were getting back on track for minorities in the newly formed
republic of Nepal. In August 2008, Maoist leader Prachanda formed a coalition government and
the Nepali Congress became the opposition (The Carter Center, 2014: 20). In May 2009, both PM
Prachanda and President Yadav resigned, and Madhav Kumar Nepal was named the new PM (The
Carter Center, 2014: 20). The Maoists went into the opposition and launched a series of protests.
In December of 2009, four people were killed in clashes for land grabs in the western region of
Nepal and the Maoist Party supported the protests (The Carter Center, 2014: 20). By May of 2010,
the governing coalition and the Maoist opposition could not come up with a new constitution, so
they agreed to extend the deadline to May 2011 (Parakh, 2015). In June of 2010, PM Madhav
Kumar Nepal resigned under Maoist pressure, but he kept on serving as a caretaker PM for seven
months because the parties involved could not come to an agreement on who to elect as a
replacement (The Carter Center, 2014: 20). In February 2011, Jhala Nath Khanal was elected as
the new PM. In May of the same year, the Constituent Assembly again failed to draft a new
constitution and the deadline was further extended for three months, although the Supreme Court
claimed that both extensions were unconstitutional (Parakh, 2015). In February of 2014, the Nepali
Congress leader, Sushil Koirala was elected the new PM after he secured parliamentary support.
The parliament passed a constitution in September 2015 after which protests were organized
mostly by ethnic minorities and by people in Terai regions (“Nepal profile - Timeline,” BBC,
2017). They believed that the new constitution was discriminatory against them as they contended
that it had been rushed by established parties, which were dominated by high-caste leaders
(Haviland, 2015). In addition, according to the new constitution, the proportional representative
system at the parliament would be reduced to 48% (from 58% under the previous post-war interim
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constitution) and the minority groups believed that it was discriminatory against them (Haviland,
2015). According to the Human Rights Watch, at least forty-five people were killed (2015). In
addition, Madhesi communities created a border blockade which led to fuel shortages in the
country. The blockade was eventually removed in February 2016. In October of 2015, K. P. Prasad
became the first PM to be elected after the new constitution was drafted (“Nepal profile Timeline,” BBC, 2017). In August of 2016, the parliament elected the Maoist Party leader
Prachanda as the PM for the second time. In June of 2017, Prachanda was replaced as PM by Sher
Bahadur Deuba. In November 2017, dozens of attacks were reportedly carried out by Maoist
militants, seriously injuring at least seventeen people (Bhandari & Schultz, 2017).
Nepal’s political transitions after 2008 have been marked with unstable leadership (where many
leaders have come and gone) and protests, most of which ended in violence.
Nationalism in Nepal:
Nationalism, expressed in the form of ethnicity and caste, plays a very vital role in the
politics of Nepal. Caste and ethnicity seem to be used interchangeably in Nepal (Sharma, 2007).
According to the CIA World Factbook, 125 caste or ethnic groups were reported in the national
census and 123 languages were also reported as mother tongue in 2011. It is “unimaginable” to
not know the caste of people in Nepal (Gellner, 2007: 1823). The caste system of Nepal is inclusive
as well as exclusive at the same time. It is inclusive because it encompasses all ethnic groups in
Nepal with their varied languages, cultures, traditions and belief systems (GSEA, 2006: 11). It is
exclusionary because it classifies all these ethnic groups as distinct castes within the broad
framework of the four Varnas of the Hindu Caste system (GSEA, 2006: 11). The foundations of
social exclusion based on somebody’s ethnicity and caste were laid after the Gorkhali invasion in
the 19th Century (Jones & Langford, 2011: 371). Both Nepal’s unification under Prithvi Narayan
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Shah and its consolidation under the Rana regime (1851 – 1951) were organized based on the
Hindu caste system of the four Varnas which were further based on the concepts of ritual purity
and pollution (Bennett, 2005: 5). The four Varnas are: a) Brahmans, who are considered to be the
pure and priestly, b) Kshatriya, are considered to be warriors, c) Vaishya, who are merchants, and
d) Sudra, the peasants and laborers (Bennett, 2005: 6). Beneath these four Varnas is an
occupational group called Achut, who consist of leather workers, cleaners. This group is not only
considered to be outside of the Hindu caste system but also considered to be “impure” and
“untouchable” (Bennett, 2005: 6). Table 2.1 shows the social classification of the ethnic groups
and caste groups during the Shah-Rana period which is still relevant.
At the top of the hierarchy is the “pure” caste, collectively called Pani Chalne or “those
from whom water can be accepted.” This “pure” group is further classified into three sub-groups
namely, wearers of the sacred thread (Tagadhari), liquor drinkers (Matwali) but non-enslavable
and liquor drinkers (Matwali) but enslavable. Hill Hindus or the Parbatiya are at the top as well as
at the bottom of the hierarchy. They speak a Sanskrit-based language called Khas from which the
Nepali language has also evolved (GSEA, 2006: 11). Among the hill Hindus, the Bahuns
(Brahmins), the Chhetris and the Thakuris (Kshatriya) are classified as “pure” whereas hill Hindus
such as Sarke (cobblers) are classified as “impure.” Even the “impure” group which is collectively
known as Pani Nachalne or “those from whom water cannot be accepted” is further classified into
“touchable” and “untouchable” (Bennett, 2005: 6).
Since the 19th century, the creation of the Nepalese state was synonymous with the creation of
a Hindu state and monarchy (Jones & Langford, 2011: 371). For instance, during this time, highlevel positions in the state were awarded exclusively to those belonging to high castes such as
Bahun, Chhetri, and Thakuri (Jones & Langford: 371). Caste is often revealed simply through
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surnames, a “sure-fire indicator” of what one’s caste or ethnic group is as shown in Table 2.2
(Gellner, 2007: 1823
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Table 2.1: Nepal Social Hierarchy
Hierarchy

Habitat

Belief/Religion

A) Water Acceptable (Pure)
1) Wearers of the scared thread (Tagadhari)
“Upper caste” Brahmans and Chhetris (Parbatiya)
“Upper caste” (Madhesi)
“Upper caste” (Newar)

Hills
Terai
Kathmandu Valley

Hinduism
Hinduism
Hinduism

2) Matwali Alcohol drinkers (non-enslavable)
Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar, Thakali, Rai, Limbu
Newar

Hills
Kathmandu Valley

Tribal/Shamanism
Buddhism

Mountains/Hills
Hills
Inner Terai

Buddhism

Katmandu Valley
Terai
Europe

Hinduism
Islam
Christianity, etc

Hill
Kathmandu Valley

Hinduism
Hinduism

3) Matawali Alcohol drinkers (enslavable)
Bhote (including Tamang)
Chepang, Gharti, Hayu
Kumal, Tharu
B) Water un-acceptable/Pani Nachalne (Impure)
4) Touchable
Dhobi, Kasai, Kusale, Kulu
Musalman
Mlechha (foreigner)
5) Untouchable (achut)
Badi, Damai, Gaine, Kadara, Kami, Sarki (Parbatiya)
Chyame, Pode (Newar)

Source: Adapted from Bennett, Dahal & Govindasamy (2008)
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Animism

Table 2.2. Common surnames in Nepal
Surnames:
Newar

Khas-

Magar

Khas-Brahmin

Tamang

1. Tamang

Chhetri/Thakuri/
Sanyasi

1. Shrestha

1. Thapa

1. Thapa

1. Sharma

2. Maharjan

2. Chhetri

2. Rana

2. Pokharel/Pokhrel 2. Lama

3. Shakya

3. Khatri-Chhetri

3. Pun

3. Adhikari

3. Moktan

4. Ale

4. Bhattarai

4. Yonzon

5. Gharti

5. Paudyal/Paudel

5. Pakhrin

4. Manandhar/Sayami
5. Bajracharya
(Vajracharya/Gubhaju)
Khadgi/Shahi

(K.C.)
4. Karki
5. Shahi/Singh

-

Thakuri

6. Koirala
7. Ghimire

6. Prajapati/Awal

6. Bhandari

8. Joshi

7. Pradhan

7. Bisht/Bista

9. Upadhyaya

8. Joshi

8. Giri

10. Mainali

9. Suwal

9. Raut

11. Neupane

10. Tuladhar

(Rawal/Rawat)

12. Acharya

11. Dangol

10. Malla

13. Subedi

12. Ranjitkar/Ranjit

11. Pandey/Pande

14. Gautam

13. Rajbhandari/Rajbhandary

12. Basnet/Basnyat

15. Dahal

14. Nakarmi/Naka:mi

13. Khadka

15. Rajopadhyaya

14. Rana

(Sharma/Acharya/Subedi) 15. Chand

Source: Nepal Federalism Debate, 2014
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With regard to Bhutanese names, a religious person gives names with prayer and blessings
in Bhutan. Bhutanese names have spiritual significance and are mostly based on Buddhist
principles and persons (“What is in a name?”, 2015). Generally, most Bhutanese have two names
in which the first names are mostly gender neutral whereas the second name marks the sex and is
gender restrictive (“What is in a name?”, 2015). For example, a man can be Sanjay Dorji
(Adamantine Buddha) and a woman can be Tshultrim Lhamo (Goddess of Morality). Bhutanese
names do not include family names or surnames except for royal family and some noble families
(“What is in a name?”, 2015). That means in Bhutan both men and women do not take the family's
name and, especially for women, they do not take their father's name before marriage, nor do they
take their husband's name after marriage like in Nepal. The children's names are different from
their parents and also different from their siblings.
In the 19th century and into the late 20th century, wealth was measured in terms of the size
and amount of land one owned (Gellner, 2007: 1823). Those who held more land, such as Bahuns
and Chhetris (high caste), were powerful, and those who never held land such as Dalits (low caste),
were considered powerless and dependent on others (Gellner, 2007: 1823). Later during the
autocratic Rana regime (1846 – 1951), more power was given to ones belonging to high caste
when the society was classified based on orthodox Hindu nations (Gellner, 2007: 1823). As an
illustration, the National Legal Code of 1854, known as the Muluki Ain, attempted to apply the
“dharmasastras” (a collection of ancient Sanskrit texts, outlining the codes of conduct and moral
principles for Hindus) to the laws of a heterogeneous country (Gellner, 2007: 1823). According to
the Legal Code, all groups were called Jat, distinguished by wearing the sacred thread, the
Tagadhari. Tagadhari wearers were viewed as elites and those who did not wear the sacred thread
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were known as the Matwali, or alcohol-consuming classes. The detailed classification of caste in
the Muluki Ain, is given in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Caste Categories of Muluki Ain
Hierarchy

Category

Social Group

A

Wearers of the holy cord

Parbate Bahun/Chhetri, Newar Brahman, Indian Brahman,
Newar Hindu
Non-enslavable

alcohol Magar & Gurung (associated with Gorkhali army),

B
drinkers

Sunuwar (Hinduised), Newar (Buddhist)
Bhote

C

Enslavable alcohol drinkers

(Buddhist),

Chepang/Kumal/Hayu

(ethnic

minorities), Tharu (Tarai ethnic), Gharti (progeny of freed
slaves)

D

Impure but touchable

Low caste Newar, Muslim, Christian

E

Impure and untouchable

Parbate artisan castes, Newar scavenger castes

Source: Gurung, 2005
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Ethnicity influences many events in the history of the politics of Nepal. For example, from
1960 until 1990, when Nepal was ruled by the Panchayat System, King Mahendra discouraged
ethnic and caste affiliations in nation-building (Gellner, 2007: 1824). All political parties were
banned, and all groups were designed to mobilize for the country's development. Even in this
system, the people belonging to higher caste such as Bahuns, Chhetris, and some Newars were
benefitting the most. One’s opportunity to play a role in nation building was determined by one’s
education level. Individuals belonging to the higher caste were the ones’ who were highly
educated. In addition, the People's War (1996-2006) was started by the Maoists on the ground that
the ethnic and caste discrimination in Nepal had to stop. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
[CPN(M)] played the ethnic card for their own interest (Gellner, 2007: 1826). For example, they
established their bases in tribal areas such as Rolpa and Rakum which made it easier for them to
recruit people to their cause and to garner more support from minorities with their goal to abolish
monarchy (Gellner, 2007: 1826). Due to this initiative, building their bases in minority settled
places, the Maoists triumphantly won in 2008 with the largest percentage of seats in the parliament
(38.2%) (The Carter Center, 2009: 22).
Similarly, the Constituent Assembly is structured to be the most inclusive and representative
legislative body ever formed in Nepal (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2010). According to Nepal’s
interim constitution of 2007, the Constituent Assembly is composed of members elected on the
basis of the equality of population, geographical congeniality and specificity, and on the basis of
the percentage of the population in Madhes (The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063, 2007). The
members will be nominated on the basis of the following clauses:

(a) The members elected on the basis of first-past-the-post electoral system consisting of
one member from each of the two hundred and forty election constituencies delimited by
the Election
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(b) Three hundred and thirty-five members to be elected on basis of the proportional
electoral system where voters vote for parties while treating the whole country as a single
election constituency; and
(c) Twenty-six members to be nominated by the Council of Ministers, on the basis
of understanding, from amongst the prominent persons who have rendered
outstanding contributions to national life, and the indigenous peoples which could
not be represented through the elections as referred to in Clauses (a) and (b).
It further adds,
For the purpose of the election to the Constituent Assembly, every citizen of Nepal
who has attained the age of eighteen years on or before the last day of the month of
Mangsir of the year 2063, (15 December 2007) shall be entitled to vote, as provided
in law (The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063, 2007).
Still, minorities such as the Raute, who are only about 618 people, according to the 2011
census, remain unrepresented at the constituent assembly (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2012). The
first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in May of 2012 because it was unable to put a new
constitution into effect. They also lacked consensus on the number, boundaries, or names of the
new federal states (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2012). In 2010, the Committee for State
Restructuring and Distribution of State Power (CSRDSP) had proposed fourteen federal states in
Nepal (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2012). Seven out of fourteen were supposed to use ethnic
names, five with geographic names and two were supposed to have combined ethnic-linguisticgeographic names (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2012). This proposal was not positively received by
smaller states whose leaders viewed such moves as impracticable.

Later in 2012, the High-Level State Restructuring Commission (HLSRC) was given the
responsibility to develop an alternative plan. They proposed ten territorial states and one nonterritorial state (for Dalits). Out of ten, six were given ethnic names, two with geographic names,
and two with mixed names. In the same context, a minority of the HLSRC did not agree with the
proposal and instead proposed for six non-ethnic geographic states (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016:
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2012). As a result, the Constituent Assembly was unable to vote on any form of a constitution. The
Supreme Court refused the Constituent Assembly’s request for further extensions and the
Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 2012 (Adhikari & Gellner, 2016: 2012). The first
Constituent Assembly was dissolved because it could not decide Nepal’s federalism would be
based in ethnicity (Jatiya-Sanghhiyata) or identity (Pahican-Sahitko Sanghiyata). Ethnicity was
so important for Nepal that both committees, (the CSRDSP and HLSRC), which were responsible
to create states for Nepal, were not agreeing on the number and the boundaries of states but were
in consensus for the distribution of states based on ethnicities.
Nepal is home to more than 100 “indigenous nationalities” but none of these nationalities
can be considered as a majority group (Shresthra, 2008: 199), as shown in Table 2.4 and Figure
2.1. Even the predominant Khas population, which consists of Hill Brahmin (Bahun) and Chhetri
castes who speak Nepali and practice Hinduism, are not in the majority (Shresthra, 2008: 199).
Although Madhesis make up 30% of population, they are not included in the Table 2.4 or Figure
2.1. It is because Madhesi are the people who inhabit that flat southern region of Nepal (the Terai
plains) (Shresthra, 2008: 199). Madhesi include caste groups such as Brahmin and Dalits, religions
such as Hindu and Islam, and linguistic groups such as Maithili, Bhojpuri and Tharu (Shresthra,
2008: 199). There is a clear tension between the civic form of nationalism and ethnic nationalism.
The ruling minority (Khas) has imposed its language, religion and culture upon all other
nationalities under the name of civic nationalism (Sharma, 2007). Other nationalities have tried to
rescue their culture, religion and language from this one-sided nationalism (so-called the caste-hill
Hindu elite nationalism) through ethnic movements but internal hierarchies and competitions
within these groups have led to disunity among themselves (Sharma, 2007)
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Figure 2.1: Ethnic Groups in Nepal (2011)
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Source: CIA World Factbook, 2011
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Table 2.4: Some distinct ethnic/caste features reported in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses, Nepal

Region

2001

2011

census

census

1991 census

Total ethnic /caste groups reported

60

100

125

Mountain

3

5

9

Hill

27

45

55

Terai

29

50

61

40

25

1

2

9

10

Not
Addition of ethnic/caste groups from previous census
applicable
Ethnic/caste groups listed in the previous census were not

Not

reported in following census

applicable

Number of ethnic /caste groups whose population size

Note

declined than the previous census

applicable

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) – Nepal, 1991, 2001 and 2011
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Regional influences
Since 1950, Nepal’s most significant regional relationship is with India. The people of
India and Nepal share many family bonds, and the majority of them share the same religion.
Indians and Nepalis can travel freely across borders. Yet the governments of Nepal and India have
almost always shared a bittersweet relationship (Sharma, 2016). It is often said that India
“midwifed” the birth of democracy in Nepal (Mishra, 2004: 630). In 1950, India provided refuge
to Nepal’s King Tribhuvan and his family when they sensed some security threat against them in
Nepal from the Ranas because King Tribhuvan was involved in a campaign which was aimed at
removing the Rana oligarchy from power (Mishra, 2004: 630). In addition to providing refuge,
India envisaged a deal for Nepal’s political future. India’s Prime Minister Nehru even called it a
"middle way" that included a constituent assembly whose prime responsibility will be to draft a
constitution, an interim government with popular representation but a Rana Prime Minister and
recognition of King Tribhuvan (Mishra, 2004: 630). Although all three involved parties (New
Delhi, Ranas and King Tribhuvan) agreed to the deal, they were neither consulted nor given an
opportunity to sit together and discuss the deal with India (Mishra, 2004: 630). Every
communication regarding the deal took place through PM Nehru and not among the parties
involved (Ranas and King Tribhuvan).
After the death of King Tribhuvan in 1955, the honeymoon in the Nepal-India relationship
ended (Mishra, 2004: 631). When King Tribhuvan’s son, Mahendra, was crowned, he transformed
Nepal’s domestic and international politics. In order to reduce Nepal’s dependence on India, he
established diplomatic ties with China and other countries, changed the medium of instruction in
all school to Nepali (from Hindi), restricted all foreigners from purchasing properties in Nepal and
requested India to withdraw its military mission from Kathmandu (Thapliyal, 1995: 94-95). Nehru
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was shocked with these moves, describing them as a “reversal of the democratic process in Nepal”
(Thapliyal, 1995: 94-95). Furthermore, King Mahendra fostered a new Nepali Nationalism which
is also known as the “Mahendra Nationalism” (Kantha: 81). Mahendra nationalism was about
providing the fear of Indian domination in Nepal while improving the King’s autocratic ambitions
and keeping a more balanced relation with both India and China (Kantha: 81).
From 1955 to 1989, Indian-Nepali relations did not improve. They only worsened in 1989.
In 1989, India imposed a fifteen-month long economic blockade on Nepal after Kathmandu bought
anti-aircraft guns from China (Mishra, 2004: 631). 19 out of 21 trade routes were closed and 13
out of 15 transit routes were also shuttered (Mishra, 2004: 631). It led to chaos in the day-to-day
life of Nepalese. India also denied Nepal’s access to port facilities in Calcutta, launching an
economic crisis in Nepal. Its GDP growth rate dropped from 9.7% in 1988 to 1.5% in 1989 (Shah,
2016). Nepal also accused India of playing an important role in supporting the Maoist insurgency
in Nepal. Their suspicion grew when Nepal and India engaged in a border dispute over the
Kalapani region in 1998, and several political parties used this nationalist sentiment as political
capital. The Maoists did not engage in any anti-India activity, though they were regarded as vocal
critics of India in the past (Mishra, 2004: 635). By early 1999, news started surfacing regarding
links and secret meetings between the Maoists and "like-minded groups" in India (Mishra, 2004:
635). The Nepalese government claims that Nepal’s anti-establishment groups relied heavily on
covert and overt Indian support (Mishra, 2004: 636). Nepal further believes that the top Maoist
leaders were living in India and New Delhi knew about it but did not do anything (Mishra, 2004:
636).
Kathmandu further accused New Delhi of supporting a group of ethnic Madhesi protestors
(Shah, 2016). Madhesi are of Indian origin and make up 30% of Nepal’s population who are
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responsible for imposing blockades against crucial imports such as medicine and food from India
in 2015 (Shah, 2016). Nepal believes that India helped these groups in orchestrating the blockades
and causing shortages in the country.
The economic relationship between India and Nepal has also fluctuated over the years,
especially during Nepal’s political transition as shown in Table 2.5. Although Nepal’s imports
from India have increased from 2003 to 2010, their exports show fluctuations. They dropped from
2007-8 and again in 2009-10.
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Table 2.5: Nepal’s annual trade with India (2003 – 2010)

2003-4

2004-5

2005-6

2006-7

2007-8

2008-9

EXPORT

3077.71

3891.69

4071.47

4172.88

3855.57

4100.59

3999.37

IMPORT

7873.95

8867.55

10714.31

11587.23

14237.65

16243.76

21711.43

BALANCE

4796.24

4975.86

6642.84

7414.35

10382.08

12143.17

17712.06

VOLUME

10951.66

12759.24

14785.78

15760.11

18093.22

20344.35

25710.80

SHARE IN %

57.58

61.29

63.18

62.03

64.34

57.77

59.08

Note: Amount in Ten Milion Nepalese Rupees
Source: Economic Servey 2011, Ministry of Finance, GoN.
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2009-10

As a result of such bittersweet relations with India, Nepal extended its friendship to China,
which upset India even further. Nepal developed its diplomatic relations with China in 1956 and
has since then accepted China’s claim over Tibet and has also reduced Nepal’s embassy in Lhasa
to a consulate general office (Jha, 2016: 101). As a result, China constructed a road between
Kathmandu and Lhasa in 1961 (Jha, 2016: 101). In 1962, during China’s war with India, Nepal
adopted a neutral position, irrespective of the fact that Nepal had a security pact with India. Even
when Nepal’s Prime Minister, Matrika Prasad Koirala was heard saying, “India’s defense was
Nepal’s defense,” they did not take India’s side in 1962 (Jha, 2016: 102). Further, Nepal started
importing arms from China without India’s knowledge in 1988-1989 and in 2005 (“Chinese deliver
arms to Nepal”, 2005).
In 2005, when India, the US, and the UK suspended their military aid to Nepal after King
Gyanendra assumed direct power, China dispatched ammunition for Nepal’s government to help
them fight Maoist rebels (Shah, 2016). In 2015, when there were blockades by Madhesi protestors,
China opened the border crossing point at Jilung, which links Tibet and Nepal (Shah, 2016).
Through that, China transported petroleum products and other goods. Between 2015 and 2016,
China’s aid increased from USD 24 Million to USD 128 Million (Shah, 2016). In 2016, Nepal
allowed China to extend its railway link from the Nepal-China border in Kerung to Kathmandu
and further to Pokhara and Lumbini, which are at "stone's throw distance" from the Nepal-India
border (Jha, 2016: 102). In return, China allowed Nepal to use its seaport in Guangzhou for trade
(Jha, 2016: 102)
Nepal is justifying its closeness to China by blaming India for actions in 2015-2016. The
elites in Nepal believe that Indian leaders supported and backed Madehsis and Tharu groups for
the economic blockade (Jha, 2016: 103). India denies involvement and is not comfortable with the
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fact that China’s influence in Nepal is increasing with time (Jha, 2016: 102). India, though, made
it clear that they are not happy with Nepal’s constitution as they believe it is exclusive and does
not adequately protect minority groups. India claims that Madehsis, Tharus and hill Janajatis
account for over two-thirds of Nepal's population and these groups of people have shown their
dislike towards the constitution. If Dalits are included in the alliance (Madhesis, Tharus and
Janajatis), almost 72% of the population is against the constitution and only 28% (who mostly
consist of Bahun, Chhetri) supports the constitution (Majumder, 2015). So, India has openly asked
Nepal to amend its constitution and make it more inclusive whereas Nepal does not appreciate
India’s involvement.
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Chapter Three:
Nationalism and Regional Influence in Bhutan’s Political Transitions
This chapter will look into a brief history of Bhutan and will highlight key events that
occurred in Bhutan prior 2008 and also after 2008. In addition, it will look into the two factors:
nationalism and regional influence and their connection to the political transition of Bhutan. Under
nationalism, factors such as national policies (Driglam Namzha, Tsawasum and Gross National
Happiness) are studied and India’s active role in Bhutan’s political transitions is studied too. The
relatively peaceful context in which Bhutan’s transition has occurred has been noted by scholars
Rizai (2015) and Sakhlani and Tortajada (2016).
Country profile:
Bhutan became an absolute monarchy in 1907, when Ugyen Wangchuck was chosen as the
hereditary ruler of Bhutan. During his reign, he was credited with making Bhutan a peaceful
country whose foundations were based on Buddhism, giving importance to education and
improving Bhutan’s relations with its neighbors. For instance, he helped renovate Swayanbhunath
Temple in Kathmandu, established schools such as Lame Goenpa and Wangduecholing in 1914,
and he met King George V in 1906 and visited Delhi in 1911 (“Ugyen Wangchuck Biography”,
2017 ) Bhutan’s relations with its neighbor India improved when Bhutan signed a treaty with the
newly independent India in 1949 according to which India will not interfere in Bhutan’s internal
affairs, but India will guide Bhutan in foreign relations (“Bhutan profile - Timeline”, BBC, 2017).
Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, known as the “father of modern Bhutan,” took the throne in 1952.
Because of the progressive changes he brought within the country during his reign, he became
known as a reformist monarch. Some of his contributions included establishing the legislative body
40

of Bhutan, the National Assembly, in 1953, economic planning initiative (Five Year Plans) in
196,1 and Royal Bhutan Army in 1961 (Savada, 1993). With the establishment of the legislative
body, slavery was abolished and social reforms including land redistribution to former slaves were
enacted. In addition, the first cabinet was also established in 1968. In 1971, Bhutan became a
member of the United Nations.
King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck passed away in 1972 and his son, Jigme Singye Wangchuck
took the throne and continued his father’s policy of cautious modernization (Savada, 1993).
Foreign tourists were first allowed in the country in 1974 and in 1986, the government came up
with a new law according to which citizenship was granted on the basis of length of residence in
Bhutan. Following the new law in 1988, many ethnic Nepalese were branded as illegal immigrants
in 1988 and were made to leave the country (Savada, 1993). They fled to Nepal. Bhutan and Nepal
tried to resolve the refugee problem in 1993 and by 1996, Nepal demanded that Bhutan accept all
the refugees back in the country who are currently in camps in Nepal (“Bhutan profile - Timeline”,
BBC, 2017). The talk has gone nowhere since then. In 2002, Bhutan still had camps belonging to
the rebel groups from Assam, India. Bhutan had given them a deadline to leave the country by the
end of 2001, but they denied (“Bhutan profile – Timeline,” BBC, 2017). In December of 2003,
Bhutanese soldiers fought these Indian separatist’s rebels and were driven out of the country
(“Bhutan profile – Timeline,” BBC, 2017).
In 1998, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck adopted a policy of decentralization and ceded
his role as the head of the government to the National Assembly. Six ministers were nominated
and placed in front of the National Assembly to be elected by the remaining members. The minister
with the highest number of “yes” votes was appointed as the Chairperson of the Council of Cabinet
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Ministers (CCM) and the role of Chairman was to be rotated among the ministers after a one-year
period.
In March 2005, the government presented the constitution according to which Bhutan
might become a parliamentary democracy. It was presented to the population as a referendum. The
fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, announced that he would abdicate in 2008, helping to
move the country along as a parliamentary democracy. In September of 2006, preparations such
as training officials for the polls began and in December of the same year, King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck abdicated his throne and his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck was crowned
the new King.
In February of 2007, Bhutan signed an agreement with India which was a revision of the
treaty signed in 1949. The treaty gave Bhutan more say over its foreign and defense policies, both
regionally and internationally (Sherpa, 2013). In April of the same year, mock elections were held
in order to familiarize voters and to prepare them for upcoming elections in 2008. In July Prime
Minister Khandu Wangchuck resigned in order to compete in the upcoming elections. The office
of prime minister released a statement stating that “the prime minister on behalf of his colleagues
went to His Majesty the King and submitted their resignations as they have expressed their desire
to join politics” (“Bhutan’s PM resigns ahead of first national poll, 2007).
The only recorded violence in the political transition of Bhutan took place in January and
February of 2008, when a series of bomb blasts took place including one in the capital Thimphu
which wounded at least one person (“Series of bomb blast rock Bhutan, one hurt”, 2008). The
attacks were blamed on groups associated with exiled Nepalese. Apart from that, Bhutan has
completed two elections since 2008. In March of 2008, the first parliamentary election took place,
in which Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party) (DPT) won 45 out of 47
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seats at the parliament, becoming authorized to form the government. The remaining two seats
were won by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). DPT’s leader, Jigme Y. Thinley, became the
new PM of Bhutan. The first parliamentary election was completed smoothly and in November of
2008, Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck was crowned as the fifth King of Bhutan as the fourth
King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck abdicated as announced in 2003. Similarly, in 2013 (July), the
second parliamentary elections took place in similar fashion, smooth and non-violent, in which
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won 32 seats and Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (Bhutan Peace and
Prosperity Party) (DPT) won 15 seats (“Bhutan profile - Timeline”, BBC, 2017). PDP’s leader,
Tshering Tobgay, became the new Prime Minister. The third parliamentary election is scheduled
to take place in 2018 and by October 2017, five registered political parties were gearing up for the
third parliamentary election (“Bhutan profile - Timeline”, BBC, 2017).
Elections are becoming increasingly more competitive. In 2008, there were only two
parties competing but in 2013, there were four parties and the number has increased to five in
2018. In addition, incidences such as electoral violence and vote-buying were very rare and
virtually unknown, respectively (Turner, 2015).
Even though the transition avoided violence, Bhutan’s transition has its challenges. One
negative thing that has happened since Bhutan’s political transition is a decline in voter turnout. It
has been noted that in the 2013 parliamentary election, especially for the Upper House (National
Council) election, registered voters’ turnout fell from 53 percent in 2008 to 45 percent in 2013
(Turner, 2015). Similarly, the general election saw a drop of registered voters turnout from 79
percent in 2008 to 66 percent in 2013 (Turner, 2015). If these drops are to continue, it raises
concerns regarding Bhutan’s citizens’ commitment and acceptance of democracy. Furthermore,
women’s representation is decreasing, too. In 2013, no woman was elected for the Upper House
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and only four were elected for the Lower House which consists of 47 members (Turner, 2015).
Although freedom of expression is a right guaranteed by the constitution, the mass media practices
self-censorship and does not publish stories which are very critical of government. The 2014
Reporters Without Borders ranked Bhutan 92 out of 180 countries in terms of media freedom
(Turner, 2015).
Nationalism:
The basic principles of Bhutan's polity are based on factors including cultural
identification, national independence and synthesis capacity (Mathou, 2009: 229). In regard to the
cultural identification, building unity out of diversity has been one of the main threads of Bhutan’s
political history (Mathou, 2009: 229). When Bhutan faced various external aggression from Tibet
and internal strife in the 17th century, Bhutanese leaders thought that the creation of a nation-state
was a must-do step for Bhutan's survival (Mathou, 2009: 229). Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal
(1616 –1651) is credited with unifying Bhutan and also for introducing the first codified laws,
known as Chathrim (Mathou, 2009: 229). Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal is regarded for founding
Bhutan as a new country which is both religiously and politically independent from Tibet (Dorji,
1990-1991). He also established common traditions such as the dress code and rituals including
sangha community which made Bhutanese cultural identity stronger (Dorji, 1990-1991).
Even though it is located in a very strategic position, Bhutan has never been colonized.
From Bhutan’s perspective, national independence was correlated to the autonomy of the local
polity, a strong sense of national pride among Bhutanese, and a culture of isolationism that Bhutan
has adopted until the 1960s (Mathou, 2009: 230). Bhutanese leaders accept that one way of
strengthening nationalism is by not ignoring foreign influence (Mathou, 2009: 234). Rather,
Bhutan adopts innovations and transforms them to align with local values, hereby becoming
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distinctively Bhutanese (Mathou, 2009: 234). This process is often known as “Bhutanization”
(Mathou, 2009: 234). As an illustration, Bhutan did not adopt democracy as it is in other countries.
Instead, it adopted it and customized it in order to match Bhutanese taste and lifestyle. Democracy
in Bhutan was not just about elections and political competitions, but all parties involved had to
held up the idea of Gross National Happiness and try to install and promote it as much as they can.
So, democracy, is given a Bhutanese touch, hereby strengthening the national identity. As Bhutan
opened itself to development only in the 1960s, it was ready and eager to avoid mistakes which
were committed elsewhere. Although it was heavily dependent on foreign aid and expertise, it
followed its own set of values and priorities due to which development in Bhutan has caused
minimal social, economic, political, and cultural disruptions (Mathou, 2009: 234).

As an

illustration, though the judicial system of Bhutan is based on laws from the 17 th Century Zhabdrung
Ngawang Namgyal’s Chathrim and its Buddhist values, the justice system is also evolving in order
to face the challenges of the current time (Mathou, 2009: 234). The judiciary system of the country
takes its role as the guardian of the constitution very seriously. For example, it did not go easy on
the speaker and a cabinet minister when they were found guilty of illegal land dealings and in
addition, the judiciary has also been adopting modernization by appointing younger judges who
had modern legal trainings (Turner, 2015).
Nationalism in Bhutan is based on, among others, two very important concepts: Driglam
Namzha and Tsawasum. Driglam Namzha is described as Bhutan’s code of etiquette where Drig
means order, norm, and conformity, Lam meaning a way of having order, and Namzha meaning a
concept or a system (Phuntsho, 2004: 575). The code is described as:

. . . a set of values and etiquette that teaches a person to conduct himself in a civilized and
cultured manner. It imparts in people a sense of responsibility and respect for each other as
human beings living together in a society . . . respect for the dignity of one’s fellow human
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being and an awareness of one’s responsibilities and obligations as a member of a wellordered society (Saul, 2000: 332).
Driglam Namzha is said to have started with Buddhist Vinaya or monastic discipline and
was institutionalized in Bhutan in the 17th century by Zhandrung Ngawang Namgyal and his close
circle (Phuntsho, 2004: 575). In modern times, Bhutan promoted Driglam Namzha not just as a
code of conduct but also as a "marker of Bhutanese identity" (Phuntsho, 2004: 575). In a royal
decree issued on 16 January 1989, it required all citizens to observe Driglam Namzha in terms of
values, dress code (gho for men and kira for women) and etiquette in the following contexts:

inside and outside Dzong premises [fortress-monasteries now used as centers of district
administration]; [at] all Government Offices; at the Schools; [at] the Monasteries; at the
official functions and 'Public Congregations' (RGB 1992b: appendix. The appendix also
stated that Pandits, Pujaris [Hindu priests] and non- nationals would be exempt from the
requirement) (Hutt, 1996: 403).
Similar to Driglam Namzha, Tsawasum is another important aspect of Bhutan nationalism.
Tsawasum means three roots or foundations and the country; King and government are mentioned
as Tsawasum. It started as a concept in the 1950s and re-emerged in 1989 at the 65th session of the
National Assembly where “anti-national” conspiracy was officially defined as an act of treason
against the Tsawasum (Phuntsho, 2004: 576). All persons who went against the Tsawasum were
branded as “ngolops” or “anti-nationals” (Phuntsho, 2004: 576). According to Karma Phuntsho,
"Tsawasum became an iconic political category which people cited so profusely as the
cause to fight for loyalty and service to Tsawasum became the mantra to execute patriotism
and nationalism in order to combat the threats posed by the crisis. It served as a buzzword
which encapsulated everything that is Bhutanese and that Bhutan stood for" (Phuntsho,
2004: 576).
Under the umbrella of Tsawasum, slogans such as, “One Nation, One People” became the
theme of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1987 –1992), which was introduced in order to instill a greater
sense of unity and nationalism among the population as a whole (Phuntsho, 2004: 576).
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Bhutan is most famously credited with introducing the concept of Gross National
Happiness (GNH), which is about measuring the development of the country in terms of its
citizens' happiness. It is also about trying to balance economic development with the emotional
and spiritual well-being of the people. It was a term that was coined by the fourth King, Jigme
Singye Wangchuck in 1971. One of the pillars of Gross National Happiness is Preservation and
Promotion of Culture which contributes 10% to GNH index as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Contribution of Domains to GNH Index
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48

Culture is viewed as a pillar because it “facilitates sovereignty of the country and provides
identity to the people” (Ura, Akire, Zangmo & Wangdi, 2012: 20). When GNH is measured,
culture is used as an important indicator to measure the happiness of the people and culture is a
vital component of Bhutanese nationalism because Bhutan is neither economically nor militarily
strong. One thing that is imperative for Bhutan’s survival as a nation is its unique culture. It gives
Bhutanese people a sense of identity in a rapidly globalizing world by linking individuals to the
society and teaching them values and beliefs (Ura, Akire, Zangmo & Wangdi, 2012: 20). Culture
is categorized into forms such as language, artisan skills, socio-cultural participation and Driglam
Namzha, and are then measured (Ura et al. 2012: 20). Artisan skills are measured in terms of
people's interest and knowledge in 13 arts and crafts (collectively known as Zorigchusum) (Ura et
al. 2012: 21). A sufficiency threshold is set at one, which implies that every person must know at
least one skill in order to get a good score in this indicator (Ura et al. 2012: 21). Socio-cultural
participation is calculated by averaging the number of days spent on participation in socio-cultural
activities within the past 12 months (Ura et al. 2012: 22). The sufficiency threshold is set at 6-12
days in a year (Ura et al. 2012: 22). The indicator, Driglam Namzha is further divided into two
sub-indices, perceived importance of Driglam Namzha and perceived change in practice and
observation during the last few years (Ura et al. 2012: 23). Both sub-indices are measured on 3point scales which ranges from ‘not important' to ‘very important' for the perceived importance
and ‘getting weaker' to ‘getting stronger' for the perceived change (Ura et al. 2012: 23). The
sufficiency threshold is set at ‘important' for perceived importance and at ‘getting stronger' for
perceived change (Ura et al. 2012: 23).
Bhutan’s society consists of broad ethnic and linguistic groups namely: the Ngalop, the
Sharchop, Nepalese, and several aboriginal peoples and as shown in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.2. Ethnic groups in Bhutan
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Indigenous or migrant tribes

Table 3.1. Languages in Bhutan
Languages

Composition

Dzongkha (Official)

24%

Sharchopkha

28%

Lhotshamkha

22%

Other (include foreign languages)

26%

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2018
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The Ngalop, which means “the earliest risen or the first converted,” are of Tibetan origin
who migrated to Bhutan as early as the ninth century. They are often known as Bhote (people of
Bhotia or Tibet) (“Background Notes on Countries of the World: Bhutan’” 2008). The Ngalops
are mostly settled in the west and the northern side of the country. They are also the people who
introduced Tibetan culture and Buddhism in Bhutan (“Background Notes on Countries of the
World: Bhutan’” 2008). The Sharchop, which means “easterner,” are Indo-Mongoloid people who
migrated from Assam and even Burma (“Background Notes on Countries of the World: Bhutan’”
2008). The Sharchops have been largely assimilated into the Tibetan-Ngalop culture, and it seems
The CIA World Factbook incorporated Sharchop into Ngalop when they listed the ethnic groups
of Bhutan as shown in Figure 3.1. Sharchops often practice slash-and-burn and tsheri agriculture
which uses a piece of land for cultivation for the period of three or four years until the land is
exhausted (Savada, 1993). Once the land is used, they move on to new land and repeat the same
process. The aboriginal or indigenous tribal people are scattered over different villages in Bhutan.
They include tribes such as Drokpa, Lepcha and Doyas (“Background Notes on Countries of the
World: Bhutan’” 2008). They are both culturally and linguistically similar to people of West
Bengal, India (Savada, 1993). The fourth group are of Nepalese origin. The first groups of
Nepalese migrated to Bhutan from eastern Nepal in the late 19 th and early 20th century (Savada,
1993). They settled in the southern foothills of Bhutan and they too, like Sharchops, practice tsheri
agriculture.
Bhutan also hosts a sizable number of Tibetan refugees. Almost 6000 Tibetan refugees
came into Bhutan in the 1959 aftermath of the Chinese army’s occupation of Tibet (“Background
Notes on Countries of the World: Bhutan’” 2008). The number rose to 10,000 by 1987 (Savada,
1993). The Bhutanese government offered citizenship to those in the country, but most were
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unwilling to accept it. The government of Bhutan saw it as a lack of allegiance on the part of the
Tibetans and in 1979, Bhutan decided to expel those who refused citizenship to India (Savada,
1993). India, after initial reluctance, accepted more than 3100 Tibetans between 1980 and 1985
(“Background Notes on Countries of the World: Bhutan’” 2008). Although Bhutan accepted some
more Tibetan refugees in 1989 when they were fleeing the martial law in Tibet, the government of
Bhutan in the late 1980s decided to refuse Tibetan refugees (Savada, 1993).
Similarly, language is another important aspect of Bhutanese nationalism. It is so important
that it is a core factor of Bhutanese culture which, in turn, is a very important aspect of Bhutanese
national identity. In terms of language, the national language of Bhutan is Dzongkha and all other
nineteen languages are described as dialects (Ura et al. 2012: 20).
Regional influence:
Since 1949, Bhutan has considered India its closest friend. The two countries have had a
friendly relation for more than 50 years (Sherpa, 2013). Bhutan’s Prime Minister, Tshering
Tobgay states, “the relation between Bhutan and India have really stood the test of time; we have
worked together. Our good relationship was founded and given shape by our King and former
Kings and leaders of India” (Sherpa, 2013). The friendship was first established in August 1949,
by the third King of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck and India PM, Jawaharlal Nehru (Sherpa,
2013). Bhutan and India signed the Treaty of Friendship in 1949, focusing on free trade and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs (Sherpa, 2013). However, Bhutan agreed to let India
guide it in terms of foreign policy and both countries consult each other on foreign and defense
affairs (Sherpa, 2013). Article 2 of the Treaty states:
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“The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal
administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the
advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations” (Stobdan, 2017).

In between all geopolitical pressure, Bhutan was loyal to India and it proved its loyalty
time and again. Bhutan’s diplomatic ties with India were strengthened in 1968 with the
appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimphu (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012).
Since then, India has been extending financial assistance to Bhutan’s Five-Year Plans, the first of
which was launched in 1961 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). For instance, for the Ninth FiveYear Plan (2002-2008), the government of India gave almost 483 Million USD to Bhutan and for
the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2008-2013), India gave almost 630 Million USD to Bhutan which was
used to construct democratic institutions such as the construction of the supreme court, offices
such as Royal Audit Authority, Election Commission, anti-corruption Commission and the Office
of Attorney General (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012).
Bhutan stood with India during India’s conflict with China in 1962; Bhutan supported
India in its push for Bangladeshi independence in 1971; and King Jigme Singye Wangchuck
personally led his troops to fight Indian insurgent groups who were functioning from Bhutan
(Stobdan, 2017). In addition, Bhutan never played the China card with India and never refused
India from using its hydro power assets (Stobdan, 2017). India, on the other hand, started taking
Bhutan for granted and they “mistook Bhutanese fidelity for obeisance to Indian paternalism”
(Stobdan, 2017). Bhutan started to doubt India’s ability to protect it from China and Bhutan’s
insecurity was aggravated when India annexed Sikkim in 1975 (Stobdan, 2017). Following such
insecurities Bhutan demanded amendments in the treaty and it was revised in 2007 and the clause
regarding Bhutan needing India's guidance in its foreign policy was replaced (Sherpa, 2013). The
new Article 2 now states that India and Bhutan “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues
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relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for
activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other” (Stobdan, 2017).
Similarly, in terms of trade, India is Bhutan’s leading trade partner. Currently, the major
items of exports from Bhutan to India are electricity (from Tala, Chukha, and the Kurichhu
Hydroelectric Project), base metals and articles, minerals, vegetable fat and oils, alcoholic
beverages, chemicals, cement, timber and wood products, cardamom, fruit products, potatoes,
oranges and apples, raw silk, plastic and rubber products (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012).
Major exports from India to Bhutan are petroleum products, mineral products, base metals and
articles, machinery, automobiles & spares, vegetable, nuts, spices, processed food and animal
products, chemicals, wood, plastic, and rubber (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). Table 3.3
shows the detailed sum of imports and exports that have taken place between Bhutan and India
between 2001-2010.
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Table 3.2: Imports and Exports between Bhutan and India (2001-2010) [Rupees in Billion]

Year

Exports to
Bhutan
(Imports
from
India)
Imports
from
Bhutan
(Exports
to India)

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

6.98

4.70

7.58

10.26

10.19

12.80

13.05

15.09

17.33

23.3

5.13

5.92

7.76

9.97

14.48

22.72

21.48

20.5

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, 2012
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2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

29.30

35.2

41.8

43.89

47.85

53.74

55.28
5

26.00

26.4

27.8

28.98

31.8

31.80

32.05
2

India plays a vital role when it comes to democracy in Bhutan (Rizai, 2015: 319). It has
helped Bhutan in building democratic institutions, drafting its constitution, constructing judicial
buildings, training members of parliament and providing voting machines (Rizai, 2015: 319). The
Chief Election Commissioner of Bhutan visited India in February 2006, May 2009 and June
2011(Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). Along with him, several teams of officials such as
Dzongdas (District Collectors) and Dzongkhag (District Officers) visited India to observe various
state and local elections (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). In addition, India also offered full
assistance to Bhutan in formulating its election laws (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). India
provided a grant of Rs. 47.506 Million to source electronic voting machines from India (Ministry
of External Affairs, 2012). Furthermore, in Bhutan’s first election in March 2008, a four-member
delegation from the Election Commission of India led by Chief Election Commissioner, Shri N.
Gopalaswami visited Bhutan to observe the National Assembly Elections (Ministry of External
Affairs, 2012). In addition, Shri Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of Prime Minister and former
Foreign Secretary, and Shri Salman Haider former Foreign Secretary visited Bhutan as Election
Observers from the government of India in March 2008 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). India
also gives the highest aid to Bhutan, as shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.3. India's Foreign aid

31,587.06

INDIA'S FOREIGN AID, 2000 -01 TO 2016-17

Source: Vivek, 2017
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70.9

77.64

141.5

193.82

1,214.03

1,731.39

1,946.64

2,332.57

2,836.47

4,463.60

Figures in Rs crore

The India-Bhutan pact was tested in 2003 when Bhutan launched "Operation All Clear" to
take out Indian militants who were operating from Bhutan (Stobdan, 2017). From the early 1990s
forward, Indian insurgents started crossing the India-Bhutan border and started taking shelter in
Bhutan’s southern plains (Stobdan, 2017). By 2013, there were about 30 camps and 3100 militants
in Bhutan of which 13 belonged to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); 12 belonged to
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB); and 5 belonged to Kamtapur Liberation
Organization (KLO) (Banerjee and Liashram, 2004). The Indian government showed its concerns
regarding the presence of militants in Bhutan, and Bhutanese leaders understood the seriousness
of the situation. The government of Bhutan agreed to solve the issue in their own way which was
through dialogue and persuasion (Banerjee and Liashram, 2004). Bhutan organized several rounds
of talk with the groups, but they did not take it seriously and kept on relocating and creating new
camps. So, in 2013, Bhutan launched "Operation All Clear" to flush all the militants from
Bhutanese soil.

Bhutan has no diplomatic ties with China. Sino-Bhutanese tensions date back to 1951 when
CCP forces began to occupy Tibet, after which China also started claiming considerable territory
in central and northwestern Bhutan (Sakhlani and Tortajada, 2016). Only one talk was organized
between Bhutan and China in order to address unresolved border disputes, held in Beijing in 1984
(Nayak, 2018). Since then, Bhutan and China have signed an agreement to maintain peace and
tranquility on their shared border (Nayak, 2018). Additionally, China and Bhutan have disputes
over the Doklam Plateau in western Bhutan and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys in
northwestern Bhutan (Sakhlani and Tortajada, 2016).
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Chapter Four:
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter will compare the violent and non-violent nature of political transitions in
Nepal and Bhutan, respectively, and analyze how nationalism and regional influences impacted
their democratic transitions. Some of the factors that explain this difference are: stability of leaders
after 2008, surnames as an indicator of nationalism, ethnicity and caste systems, and the roles of
India and China in Bhutan’s and Nepal’s democratic transitions.
Violence during the Nepali transitions
Nepal went through a civil war from 1996 to 2006, which killed approximately 13,000 people
and displaced up to 200,000 people (Asia Foundation, 2017: 118). The war was launched by the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) in February of 1996, with the aim of overthrowing the
monarchy to establish a communist government (The Carter Center, 2014: 21). In 2006, the United
Nations sent a mission to Nepal, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), in order to help
Nepal restore and maintain peace. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1939 (2010),
UNMIN withdrew from Nepal on January 15, 2011 under growing resistance from the Nepali
Army, the bureaucracy, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified MarxistLeninist (Chapagain & Yardley, 2012).
Although the insurgency-related violence ended in Nepal with the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006, political landscapes remained volatile even after the
civil war (The Carter Center, 2014: 21). Political protests and clashes occurred frequently and
disrupted normal life. In 2012, the creation of ethnic-based federalism sparked protests and
violence across the country (Chapagain & Yardley, 2012). Those in favor of ethnic states believed
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that they would lead to the devolution of power and also to greater representation of marginalized
groups in both social and political fronts (Chapagain & Yardley, 2012). The view was that
minorities would be able to get greater political power by forming a majority in certain states. In
contrast, those not in favor believed that having ethnic-based federalism would prolong and deepen
ethnic divisions in the country (Chapagain & Yardley, 2012). It would also lead to ethnic tension
and undermine the tranquility of the nation (Chapagain & Yardley, 2012).
Between 2007 and 2015, several protests took place in Nepal which were related to
democratization. For instance, at least 40 people were killed in clashes at a protest over the draft
constitution in 2015 (Haviland, 2015). Violent incidents were recorded in at least six districts
between August and September 2015 alone. Some violent incidences included: Tikapur, Kailali
district on 24 August 2015; Birendranagar, Surkhet district on 10 April 2015; Bethari, Rupandehi
district on 15 September 2015; Jaleswar, Mahottari district on 11 September 2015; and Janakpur,
Dhanusa district on 11 September 2015 (Haviland, 2015).
From July to September 2015, almost all social groups, except hill “upper-caste” Bhauns and
Chhetris men, protested against various provisions of the constitution (“Nepal formally adopts new
constitution amid protests from minorities,” 2015). Ethnic minorities protested against the
reduction of the parliamentary proportional representative system, from 58% to 48%, and women’s
groups protested changes in citizenship law (“Nepal formally adopts new constitution amid
protests from minorities,” 2015). The amendment regarding the citizenship law in the constitution
restricted women’s right to pass on their citizenship to their children, irrespective of the father’s
nationality. The same law also gave Nepali fathers the right to pass on nationality to their children
irrespective of the mother’s nationality (“Nepal formally adopts new constitution amid protests
from minorities,” 2015).
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After the constitution was passed in September 2015, the conflict between the Madhesi parties
and the Nepal government in the Terai region escalated. The Madhesi parties created a three-month
blockade on goods from India, demanding greater proportional representation of Madhesis, hereby
intensifying the clashes ("Nepal profile – Timeline," BBC, 2017). The clashes resulted in 12 deaths
between November 2015 and January 2016, and also led to economic losses of Nepalese Rupee
(NPR) 2 billion (USD 19.4 Million) (Asia Foundation, 2017: 120).
The violence in the Terai region (where residents residing there believe that they have not been
treated equally as other Nepalese by the governments for years) increased after the signing of the
CPA in 2006. Various armed groups sought greater autonomy and political rights for the Madhesis
and other ethnic minorities such as the Thakuris (Asia Foundation, 2017: 121). In 2011, there were
estimated 26-armed groups in the Terai region in 2011 (Asia Foundation, 2017: 121). Nearly 400
violent election-related incidences were reported between February and June 2017 which resulted
in 12 deaths (Asia Foundation, 2017: 120).
Nepal held its first local elections in 20 years from May-September, 2017 (Asia Foundation,
2017: 123). Tensions escalated, especially in the Terai region, due to the existence of unresolved
disputes over amendments to the 2015 constitution. The Madhesis continued to stage protests,
which often ended in violence. For example, violence erupted in Saptari district on March 6, 2017,
when protestors disrupted a political rally and the police opened fire, killing five (Asia Foundation,
2017: 123).
Tensions during the Bhutanese transitions
Bhutan’s democratic transition was not violent, but it highlighted and created some tensions
within the country. Bhutan has yet to come up with the permanent solution for the Nepali
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Bhutanese or Lhotshampa refugees. Approximately 90,000 Nepali-speaking Bhutanese were
tagged as illegal immigrants and were evicted from the country in the 1990s (Freedom House,
2011). Since 2008, countries including the US, Canada and others have agreed to accept and
resettle them, but many still remain in the camps (Freedom House, 2011). The issue of Bhutanese
refugees resurfaced when four bomb blasts took place on January 20, 2008, which wounded one
person. The government claimed that the attack was launched by exiled-Nepali groups who were
trying to sabotage the election process ("Bhutan profile – Timeline," BBC, 2017). Although 42
international and 52 domestic observers present during the 2008 elections reported no major issues
in any of the 20 districts, they reported a lack of different ideological perspectives and choices
(Freedom House, 2011). The observers claimed that both major parties, Druk Phuensum Tshogpa
(Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party) (DPT) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) shared similar
manifestos and both party leaders publicly acknowledged their will to obey the King's desire to
work towards the pursuit of Gross National Happiness (GNH) (Freedom House, 2011).
Voter turnout is critical in any democracy. In Bhutan, fluctuations were seen in terms of
voter turnout in 2008 and in 2013. In the 2008 National Assembly Election, the country attained
an impressive voter turnout of 79.38% but the percentage dropped to 66.13% in the 2013 National
Assembly election (Election Commission of Bhutan, 2006-2015). Some of the fall could be
attributed to the socio-economic inequalities and relatively high unemployment rate among urban
youth in Bhutan. Polarization between the rich and the poor in Bhutan is growing at a very rapid
pace; 98% of poor people reside in rural areas whereas only 2% are in the urban areas (Wolf,
2016). Such disparities have led to grievances on the part of rural people which can be seen in their
political participation in the 2013 general election. In addition, civil society organizations remain
weak. Similarly, the unemployment rate of the country was recorded at 9.4% in 2014 (9.6% in
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2013) (Wolf, 2016). In the 2013 general election, it was observed that voter turnout was lesser in
the age group of 18-30 (32.03%) compared to the age group of 31-50 (40.18%) (Election
Commission of Bhutan, 2006-2015). This depressed level of voter turnout was connected to the
high youth unemployment rate in the country. Most among the young unemployed generation of
the country are less interested in political participation and are more concerned and dissatisfied
with the government not being able to provide them with sufficient jobs.
Although Bhutan’s transitions lack large-scale violence, they are not free of challenges.
One of them was the deprivation of religious figures from the political front. There were almost
70, 000 monks, nuns and lay priests in Bhutan in 2008 who were restricted from running for office
or voting following an Election Act which mandated that religion and religious figures remain
“above politics” (Gyeltshen and Sripokangkul, 2017: 287). Due to this act, 10% of the potential
voting body are kept away in Bhutan. This law has resulted in some monks renouncing their
spiritual journey in order to exercise their political right and voice their concerns (Gyeltshen and
Sripokangkul, 2017: 287). This move might also lead to younger generations of the country
neglecting the spiritual tradition of the country in the future.
Another challenge that has evolved during the transitions was the relatively low levels of press
freedom. The Constitution of Bhutan guarantees rights of free speech, opinion and expression. The
press plays significant roles in democratic nations as watch dogs and this freedom is limited in
Bhutan. In Bhutan, the government is often intolerant of criticisms and newspapers have been
penalized by not giving them advertisements run by governments hereby directly affecting the
revenue of concerned media (Gyeltshen and Sripokangkul, 2017: 291).
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Analysis:
A political transition is deemed smooth when there is popular participation with a widespread
sense of legitimacy in leaders. Multiple changes of leaders and the government within a short
period of time could indicate that the political situation is unstable. Such incidences could be seen
in the case of Nepal. One of the factors that shows that the political transition in Nepal have not
been smooth is the number of governments and Prime Ministers that has changed since 2008. Table
4.1 and 4.2 show the Prime Ministers in the respective countries with their length of tenure.
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Table 4.1. PMs of Nepal since 2008
Prime Ministers

Tenure

Party affiliation

Prachanda

18 August 2008 – 25 May Communist Party of Nepal
2009

Madhav Kumar Nepal

(Maoist)

25 May 2009 – 6 February Communist Party of Nepal –
2011

Jhala Nath Khanal

Unified Marxist-Leninist

6 February 2011 – 29 August Communist Party of Nepal –
2011

Baburam Bhattarai

Unified Marxist-Leninist

29 August 2011 – 14 March Communist Party of Nepal
2013

Khil Raj Regmi

(Maoist)

14 March 2013 – 11 February Independent
2014

Sushil Koirala

11 February 2014

–

10 Nepali Congress

October 2015
Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli

Prachanda

12 October 2015 – 4 August Communist Party of Nepal –
2016

Unified Marxist-Leninist

4 August 2016 – 7 June 2017

Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist)

Sher Bahadur Deuba

7 June 2017 – 15 February Nepali Congress
2018

Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli

15 February 2018 - Incumbent Communist Party of Nepal –
Unified Marxist-Leninist
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Table 4.2. PMs of Bhutan since 2008
Prime Ministers

Tenure

Party affiliation

Jigme Thinley

9 April 2008 – 28 April 2013

Bhutan Peace and Prosperity
Party

Sonam

Tobgye

Advisor

to

the

(Chief 28 April 2013 – 27 July 2013

Independent

Interim

Government)
Tshering Tobgay

27 July 2013 – Incumbent
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People’s Democratic Party

In both cases, Prime Ministers are constitutionally supposed to serve a five-year term. In Nepal,
none of the Prime Ministers to date has been able to complete a full term. The average time period
Nepali Prime Ministers have served is 11 months compared to 60 months by Bhutanese Prime
Ministers. Within a decade of the transition, ten Prime Ministers have come and gone. The reasons
behind resignations by the Prime Ministers vary, but Maoist pressure seems to be one of the
prominent reasons. For instance, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned after being in
office for only twenty-one months because the Maoists threatened to obstruct the budget session
if he did not resign and they did not provide their cooperation until he resigned on 6 February 2011
(The Carter Center, 2014: 20). Although he resigned, he still acted as the caretaker Prime Minister
for seven months while debate on his replacement raged (The Carter Center, 2014: 20).
In contrast, Bhutan has had only three Prime Ministers since 2008. The first Prime Minister,
Jigme Thinley, was elected in 2008 after winning the first parliamentary election, leaving office
five years later. In between, Sonam Tobgye, the-then Chief Advisor to the interim government,
acted as the Prime Minister until the second parliamentary election took place and the new Prime
Minister Tshering Tobgay took office in 2013.
Having a sense of legitimacy in leaders and an organized system aligns with Paul Collier’s
view that political violence can occur due to lack of accountability and low legitimacy (2009:18).
A legitimate government seems to have a clear mandate and plans in place to execute those
mandates. In Nepal’s transition, the mandates keep shifting with changes in leaders which leads to
a disorganized system. This less organized system has not been able to fulfill the general public’s
expectations hereby providing a reason for violence. On the contrary, Bhutan’s transitions seem to
have been based more on a mandate which has been executed by leaders who are stable in their
respective positions. This stability and legitimacy is able to face down opposition, making
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transitions less violent. Leadership instability in these two cases align with Roberts’s pyramidal
structure of relationship according to which the elites at the top reward the people at the base for
their support and the violence occurs when this relationship is challenged (2002: 525). Uneven
leadership in Nepal was, in a way, fueled by the presence of a conglomeration of nationalisms in
the country where different nationalist interests wanted their ‘person’ to take the leadership role.
The Maoists wanted a Maoist to be the leader. Eventually when the relationship between the top
and the base was challenged, in this case due to nationalism, violence erupted in Nepali transitions.
Similar to the impact of elite turnover, nationalism can help us understand the nature of
political transitions, too. Nationalism is an important factor in both countries, but the difference
lies in the process elites adopted. For instance, Nepal adopted ways such as Muluki Ain (the
National Legal Code of 1854 of Nepal), which placed all caste groups into different categories,
distinguishing between the wearer and non-wearers of the sacred thread. Bhutan adopted the policy
of Driglam Namzha and Tsa Wa Sum, which were Bhutan’s code of etiquette and the three
foundations of the country, respectively. Nepal’s Mulukhi Ain is more of a categorization of
different nationalities in alignment with the Hindu caste system. It also places different castes and
nationalities in a hierarchy (Gellner, 2007: 1823). According to Mulukhi Ain, the ones who wear
the scared thread are the purest and at the top of the caste hierarchy. Other groups do not wear the
scared thread and they were alcohol consumers, but these groups were not salvable. Beneath them
were alcohol consumers and they could be used as slaves. The second lowest in the hierarchy are
deemed impure, but they can be touched. Finally, the lowest are also deemed impure and they
cannot be touched by people belonging to hierarchies.
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In contrast, the policy of Driglam Namzha and Tsa Wa Sum of Bhutan focuses more on
bringing different nationalities within the country under one single statist nationality, Bhutanese.
The policy of Driglam Namzha requires all citizens in Bhutan to observe values (respect for each
other, cultured manner and awareness of one’s responsibility), national dress code (gho for men
and kira for women) and etiquette in all government offices, the monasteries, official functions
and public congregations (Hutt, 1996:403). Driglam Namzha is not different for different groups
in Bhutan alike the Muluki Ain in Nepal. Driglam Namzha is for all Bhutanese and similarly to
Driglam Namzha, the policy of Tsawasum is about how all Bhutanese should show their loyalty
and service towards the country, King and the government. Tsawasum, too is the same for all
groups of people in Bhutan. The government attempted to instill a stronger national identity in
people which would over power other sub-national or regional or ethnic nationalities present in
the country. Each policy mentioned above, both in Nepal and Bhutan, shows that for Nepal, they
highlighted different smaller nationalities and their respective group identities whereas Bhutan
tried focusing on a larger one, the national identity instead. These respective ideas are not just
legislated but are executed and followed in both countries.
In Nepal, surnames act as the most accurate indicator of one’s caste or ethnic group, an
important aspect of nationalism. This aspect of nationalism came to the forefront during the
transitions. Groups such as Madhesis and Dalits, who belong to their respective caste as they share
similar surnames, came together in respective groups demanding more representation. They
organized protests which mostly ended in violence. Due to the fact that Bhutanese names do not
clearly indicate an affinity toward a particular group or community, but rather indicated an affinity
towards a larger national group which was Bhutanese, grievances from smaller groups are not as
clearly defined.
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Nepal and Bhutan are similar when it comes to wealth being measured in terms of the size and
amount of land owned. Yet, in Nepal, the ones who had larger and more land were of high caste
including Bhauns and Chhetris and in Bhutan, it was more related to class than to caste. Bhutan’s
agrarian structure in the 1950s was based on two factors: land holding and the ability to cultivate
land (Yetsho, 2010). Most of the lands were owned by elites and aristocratic families (such as
Dung, Choeji, and Lamas), as well as the state and the monastic institutions (Yetsho, 2010). This
shows how prominent ethnic and caste identities are in Nepal as compared to Bhutan.
Part of the explanation for violence is rooted in ideology, specifically, the presence (or
absence) of Marxist-Communist parties. Although there is some evidence of the presence of a
Communist Party of Bhutan, based in the UN-run Bhutanese refugee camps in eastern Nepal,
Bhutan lacks any official communist parties. In contrast, Marxist-Communist parties in Nepal are
among the major parties. Part of the appeal of communism in Nepal is fueled by its dehumanizing
caste system. This prompted several protests which ended in violence during transitions. Dalits are
regarded as people who are outside of the caste system. They are considered so "polluted" to be
included in the four Vardas. People belonging to lower caste are not allowed to eat with or marry
people from higher caste in Nepal (Bownas, 2015: 411). Due to such discrimination, many
belonging to the lower caste joined the Marxist-Communist People's Liberation Army during the
civil war. Maoists claimed to have 100,000 militias which included women, Dalits, students,
peasants and Janajatis (ethnic groups) (GSEA, 2006). Most people belonging to the lower caste in
Nepal do not even have citizenship as they were unaware of the importance of identity card
(Bownas, 2015: 412). Widespread support for Maoists came from this section of people because
Maoists claimed to break down age-old caste hierarchy as one of their major goals (Bownas, 2015:
416). Maoists' emphasis on equality resonates with people of a lower castes (Bownas, 2015: 412).
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Two particular issues raised by Maoists resonated with Dalits: full proportional representation of
the Dalits, and an end of caste-based discrimination (GSEA, 2006).
The hierarchy among different castes makes Nepalese nationalism contested. Internal
hierarchy within a nationality makes it even more contested. For instance, although Dalits are
considered to be the lowest within the hierarchy, within Dalits there is a hierarchy, with Musahars
as the lowest category. Musahars do not own their own land so they work on the lands belonging
to higher caste people (Joshua Project, 2018). After the harvest, they collect rice that got dropped
off on the field. They are not allowed to use the same water well as higher caste people. Dalits, in
general, are not allowed to use Hindu temples as they would be "polluting" it. (GSEA, 2006).
Musahars are also called “rat eaters” as they hunt rats living underground for food (Joshua Project,
2018).
As both Nepal and Bhutan are sandwiched between two giants: India in the south and China
in the north, their influences impact the nature of the political transitions. India’s constant support
and presence in Bhutan during the transition played a major role as to why it turned out more
peaceful whereas India's off and on role in Nepal's transition helps explain why Nepal's political
transition was not as peaceful as it could be. On one hand, where India helped Bhutan strengthen
its democracy, India was blamed for instigating violence in Nepal during its transition via
supporting Madhesis groups to orchestrate blockades (Shah, 2016). Furthermore, where India
guided Bhutan through elections and framing elections laws, Nepal accused India of supporting,
both covertly and overtly, Nepal’s anti-establishment groups such as Maoist insurgencies (Mishra,
2004: 636).
Regional influences also play important roles in political transitions. In this study, it is clear
that India has occupied a significant role in both Nepal and Bhutan. India’s role in Nepal’s
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democracy has been uneven. India supported the monarchy ever since the 1950s, and started
supporting democratic forces since 1990 (Jha, 2014: 44). New Delhi came up with the "twin pillar"
policy towards Nepal in the 1950s. This concept highlighted safeguarding the monarch while at
the same time, strengthening the parliamentary democratic structure of the country (Thapa, 2008).
In return, India wanted Nepal's support when it comes to the security interest of India (Jha, 2014:
44). India expected Nepal to help India whenever its security is threatened, and it also wanted
Nepal to not support any sort of anti-Indian sentiments or movements on the Nepali soil. The
Nepal-India friendship started diluting when in 1975, King Birendra put forward the idea of Nepal
being a "zone of peace," an idea which was first endorsed by China and almost 116 countries,
excluding India supported it (Jha, 2014: 45). Nepal sought international recognition for this
declaration and the Indian government saw the declaration as being aimed against New Delhi
(Katha: 82).
The Nepal-India relationship further worsened when, in 1989, Nepal imported weapons
from China without India’s knowledge (Thapa, 2008). India took it as a breach of the security pact
between Nepal and India and imposed an economic blockade on Nepal. The blockade was imposed
specifically on the two transit points, which were Nepal’s only two transit points to trade with
foreign countries at that time (Jha, 2014: 45).
Later, India supported Nepal’s democratic parties and even the first people’s movement in
1990 (Thapa, 2008). As a result, King Birendra was forced to lift the ban on political parties and
Nepal shifted from an absolute monarchy state to a constitutional monarchy state (Jha, 2014: 45).
In 2015, Indian leaders made it clear that they are not happy with Nepal's constitution as they
believe it was exclusive and discriminatory towards minority groups such as Madhesis, Tharus,
and hill Janajatis who account for two-thirds of Nepal’s population (Ojha, 2015). India's role in
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Nepal's democracy seemed promising in the beginning but eventually, it started wearing out partly
due to resistance from Nepal and also due to Nepal's closeness to China. Where Nepal blamed
India for instigating violence during their transition by supporting Madhesis groups, India denied
the role but also did not help reduce the violent nature of Nepal’s transition and played very little
role in Nepal’s transition as compared to Bhutan’s transition.
In the case of Bhutan, India’s role was much more prominent. India is the highest supplier
of aid to Bhutan (3,158.706 Million USD compared to Nepal’s 283.647 Million USD) (Vivek,
2017). Most of this aid money goes into building the democratic institutions such as the supreme
court, offices such as Royal Audit Authority, Election Commission, Anti-corruption Commission
and the office of Attorney General and strengthening democracy in the country as stated in chapter
3 (Ministry of External Affairs: India, 2012). India’s active role in Bhutan’s democracy in terms
of building democratic institutions, drafting constitutions and framing election laws helped
increase the legitimacy of the government of Bhutan and helped them strengthen their mandate.
The Sino-Nepalese relationship is considered to be "age-old" and "deep-rooted" (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs: Nepal, 2017). Both countries adopted the five principles of peaceful
coexistence known as Panchsheel which include: mutual respect for each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence (Prasad, 2015: 26).
Although Nepal is committed to China and says that it will never allow its soil to be used for any
harmful activities against China, their relationship is mostly economic (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: Nepal, 2017). Chinese assistance to Nepal can be categorized into three categories: a)
grants, b) interest-free loans, and c) concessional loans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Nepal, 2017).
Nepal uses this assistance for infrastructure building, industrialization processes, and human
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resource development among many other tasks (Prasad, 2015: 26). Over the past 50 years, with
China's assistance, Nepal has completed over 30 projects which have further boosted Nepal's
economy (Prasad, 2015: 28). Some of the completed projects were the Arniko Highway, the Ring
Road, Prithvi Highway, Kathmandu-Bhaktapur road, Gorkha-Narayanghat road, Sunkoshi Hydro
Project, the Birendra International Convention Centre, Hetauda Cotton Mill, Bansbari Leather and
Shoe Factory, Bhaktpur Brick and Tile Factory, Bhrikuti Paper Mill, and Lumbini Sugar Mill,
Gorakkali Rubber Udhyog (Prasad, 2015: 28). In contrast, Bhutan does not receive any aid from
China. Even in terms of investment, China is the top investor in Nepal and India comes in the
second place. As an illustration, by July 2013, 575 projects under Chinese investment were
approved which created almost 31,594 jobs in Nepal (Prasad, 2015: 29). During the same fiscal
year, 566 projects under Indian investment were also approved (Prasad, 2015: 29). Furthermore,
China is Nepal's second largest trading partner, the largest source of Nepal's Foreign Direct
Investment and first tourist destination for Chinese people in South Asia (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: Nepal, 2017). In 2016, China passed India as a top aid donor to Nepal. China’s aid to
Nepal stood at $37.95 Million whereas India’s aid was $22 Million (“China Offers Aid to Nepal,
Unsettling India’s Attempt to Woo Back Old Ally,” 2017). On one hand, where Nepal has such
close economic relations with China, Bhutan has no diplomatic or economic relations with China,
so their influence is almost nonexistent in Bhutan.
Although Nepal’s nationalism seems more contested internally, it is stronger than Bhutan’s
nationalism, externally. Bhutanese nationalism is mostly seen externally as being guided and in
the suzerainty of India whereas Nepal has a more unified nationalism. Nepal does not do things in
order to please India like Bhutan does. It is evident in the fact that despite India’s dislike towards
the growing Sino-Nepalese relationship, Nepal has actually never stopped its relationship with
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China. India tried warning Nepal of its growing closeness with China via blockades in 1989 and
again in 2015 but these actions by India further pushed Nepal towards China. Bhutan never had a
formal relationship with China until 2012. Following a meeting between the then Bhutanese Prime
Minister Jigme Thinley and then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao at the Rio+20 Conference in Brazil
(2012), the leaders indicated a possibility of establishing diplomatic ties between the two countries
(Sakhlani and Tortajada, 2016). The meeting took place without India's knowledge and when India
came to know about it in time, India withdrew its petroleum subsidies to Bhutan on the eve of
Bhutan's 2012 general election (Sakhlani and Tortajada, 2016). India considers Bhutan as a very
important ally against the expansion and the influence of China in the region. India’s response
was taken as a definitive message by the new government of Bhutan. Furthermore, Bhutan (at least
partially) fulfilled its promise of protecting India’s security when it launched Operation All Clear
in 2003 against Indian militants functioning on Bhutanese soil, but Nepal failed to fulfil the similar
promise when it took a neutral stance on the India-China war in 1962. India, in a way, is fighting
to keep and if possible expand its regional influence in comparison to China’s. When China’s
influence reaches Nepal, India increases its involvement in Bhutan to make sure Bhutan does not
fall into China’s hand too.
Revisiting Proposed Hypotheses:
I established two expected findings in this research. First, I proposed that a stronger sense
of nationalism in Bhutan would explain its peaceful transition whereas contested conceptions of
nationalism in Nepal explains its comparatively violent transition. This hypothesis mostly holds.
Bhutan has a stronger sense of nationalism in the form of its national identity whereas in Nepal,
there are so many nationalisms which are separate from each other and that they weaken national
identity. Most nationalist groups in Nepal were formed on the basis of caste and ethnicity and
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individual groups were demanding change for their groups and not for all. Many nationalisms in
Nepal led to many grievances which led to different processes adopted to get their voices heard
which often resulted in violence.
Secondly, I expected to find that a strong and supportive regional influence would help
Bhutan have a peaceful democratic transition, whereas a lack of positive regional influence in
Nepal helps explain its violent democratic transition. This hypothesis holds, too. India was more
positively supportive of Bhutan’s transitions than it was in Nepal. India made sure to help Bhutan’s
government appear stronger and organized to general public, which shut down all sorts of
opposition. In Nepal’s case, India not only allegedly helped certain groups, like Madhesis, which
led to a lot of violence in the Nepali transition. India is competing with China to maintain and
expand its influence in Bhutan. India tried to reduce China’s influence in Nepal but that does not
seem to have worked. With Bhutan, India is being careful in making sure that it does not let its
presence weaken like it did in Nepal’s case. That is why India is more active in Bhutan’ transitions
than it ever was in Nepal’s transitions.
Conclusions:
There are many factors that influence political transitions. A variety of factors can at least
partially explain why some democratic transitions are more peaceful than others. Some democratic
transitions employ tactics due to factors such as lack of accountability and low legitimacy (Collier,
2009: 18). Similarly, Roberts believes that political leaders have a huge role to play in terms of
determining the way political transitions are headed (2002: 525). Although all these factors can be
applied to the cases of Nepal and Bhutan, it seems that nationalism and regional influence do a
better job of explaining why Nepal’s political transition was not as peaceful as Bhutan’s.
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Democracy in Bhutan did not develop because of popular demand. In fact, it was the former
regime which adopted democracy and implemented it. There was no popular mobilization for
democracy in the country. Some criticisms, however, claim that it was a strategy of the royal family
of Bhutan to silence political dissent and also secure the monarchy’s future by providing people
with democracy even before they asked for it (Phunstho, 2008). It has been further argued that the
constitution, which was implemented in 2008, provides far too much significance to the royal
family and also preserves their interest (Phunstho, 2008). In contrast, the majority of Bhutanese
see a royal initiative to implement democracy as selfless, generous and a noble decision (Phunstho,
2008). In addition, when the fourth king of Bhutan decided to transform the country from a
monarchy to democracy, people were unhappy about the decision and pleaded with the king not
to go ahead with the plan (Phunstho, 2008).
The Nepalese transition, however, was led by the masses. Dissolution of its monarchy,
restoration of parliament, adoption of a new constitution and even the establishment of a federal
republic, all occurred due to the fact that the general public asked for it. The leaders including
King Mahendra, King Birendra and even the Ranas tried centralizing the power and implementing
direct rule, but the public would have nothing of it. Through movements such as Jan Andolan I
and II, people demanded a multiparty system and democracy in Nepal.
Having a strong sense of nationalism can act in at least two ways. In the case of Bhutan,
having a stronger national identity and lesser categories of nationalism helped influence its
political transitions and made them much less violent. In Nepal, having multiple nationalisms
coupled with various grievances made it difficult for a more singular national identity to stand out.
Multiple nationalisms also led to a long, non-linear political transition which employed violent
tactics. In contrast, in the case of Bhutan, an absence of multiple nationalisms allowed national
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identity to take center stage, which made it much easier for the transition to take place in a more
peaceful fashion.
The comparative strategy that I have adopted in this thesis is the Most Similar Systems
Design. Although this comparative strategy works well for my cases, it has limitations. Even
though Nepal and Bhutan seem very similar from the outside, if we look closer, they are very
different cases. Other than the fact that they are both located in South Asia, other similar factors
can be debated. The major difference lies in the fact that democracy in Nepal was a bottom-up
approach whereas in Bhutan it was a top-down approach. Democracy in Bhutan was top-down:
embraced reluctantly by the citizenry even as it was something led by the King. In Nepal, the
transition was mostly bottom-up, even before 2008. In Bhutan, the constitution removed the King
as the head of government and set a mandatory retirement age for the monarchs at 65, and also
gave the parliament the power to dethrone the King altogether with the two-thirds majority vote
(Sengupta, 2007). In contrast, in Nepal, Kings such as Birendra and Mahendra have tried to take
all control in their hands and rule Nepal directly. Where the notion of self-government scared a lot
of people in Bhutan, it was something the Nepalese were seeking since the 1990s. Considering just
the way democracy came into Nepal and Bhutan might also explain why their transitions turned
out the way they did. On the whole, the two cases were not as similar as they were thought to be.
With regard to scope limitations, my research has focused on only two primary factors that
could explain the nature of political transitions in Nepal and Bhutan, but it should not be limited
to these two factors (nationalism and regional influence). There can be more factors that could be
examined by future researchers such as the conception of democracy in respective countries and
cultural practices which could explain why Bhutanese behave the way they behave and Nepalese
the way they behave. For example, both rule and cultural practices of Bhutan work against the
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mode of expressing an opinion through political protest and the courageous actions of the people
(Turner, Chuki & Tshering, 2014: 428).
This research highlights that there are significant difficulties generalizing about democratic
transitions, even when countries appear to have significant similarities. We cannot have a singular
model of democracy being practiced by all. Until and unless the core values of democracy are
upheld, it could be tailored in a way to suit the society and people. This research reveals that two
cases or countries that might seem very similar from the outside can be so different in their own
ways. We could compare them but should not try merging them in a category or under a
conclusion. Democracy and democratic transitions have long been, and will likely be, extremely
diverse. Our theories must reflect as much.

80

Bibliography
“Background Notes on Countries of the World: Bhutan” (2008). U.S. Department of State.
Retrieved
from
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=36
b836fc-a443-4dfe-8692-be23c06100e8%40sessionmgr4006.
“Chinese ‘deliver arms to Nepal’” (2005, November 25) British Broadcasting Corporation.
Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4469508.stm.
“Last Nepal King breaks ancient Taboo” (2010, February 9). The Hindu. Retrieved from
http://www.thehindu.com/features/friday-review/religion/Last-Nepal-king-breaks-ancienttaboo/article16813468.ece.
“Nepal formally adopts new constitution amid protests from minorities” (2015, September 20).
The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com.
“Ugyen Wangchuck Biography” (2017). The Famous People. Retrieved from
https://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/ugyen-wangchuck-7084.php.
“Why is Bhutan special to India?” (2017, July 1). The Hindu. Retrieved from
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-bhutan-is-special-to-india/article19195034.ece.
Adhikari, K., P. and Gellner, D., N. (2016). “New identity Politics and the 2012 collapse of Nepal’s
Constituent Assembly: When the dominant becomes ‘other’.” Modern Asian Studies 50(6). 2009
-2040.
Asia Foundation (2017). Nepal at a Glance. Retrieved from https://asiafoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Nepal-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf.
Banerjee, D., and Liashram, B., S (2004). Bhutan’s “Operation All Clear”: Implications for
insurgency and security cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/138045/IB18OperationAllClear.pdf.
Basora, A. A. (2016). The Crucial Role of Leaders in Democratic Transitions. [Review of The
Crucial Role of Leaders in Democratic Transitions, by Bitar, S., & Lowenthal, A., F] Foreign
Policy Research Institute, 1-4.
BBC (2017, June). Bhutan Profile – Timeline. BBC. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12480707.
BBC (2017, June). Nepal Profile – Timeline. BBC. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12499391.
Bennet, L., Dahal, D., R., and Govindasamy, P. (2008). “Caste, Ethniv and Regional Identity in
Nepal,” Nepal Further Studies, 1-36.

81

Bennett, L. (2005). “Gender, caste and ethnic exclusion in Nepal: Following the policy process
from analysis to action.” Arusha Conference, “New Frontier of Social Policy”, 1-48.
Bermeo, N. (1997). “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic
Transitions.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29 (3), 305-322.
Bhandari, R., & Schultz, K. (2017, November 25). Violence Flares as Nepal Heads to Landmark
Elections. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com.
Bitar, S., & Lowenthal, A., F. (2015). The Crucial Role of Leaders in Democratic Transitions.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Bollen, K., A. and Jackman, R., W. (1985). “Political Democracy and the Size of Distribution of
Income.” American Sociological Review, 438 – 457.
Bothe, W. (2015). “In the Name of King, Country, and People on the Westminster Model and
Bhutan's Constitutional Transition.” Democratization, 22(7), 1338-1361.
Bownas, R., A. (2015). “Dalits and Maoists In Nepal’s civil war: between synergy and cooptation.” Contemporary South Asia, 23:4, 409-425.
Burton, M., Gunther, R., and Higley, J. (1987). “Elite Settlements,” American Sociological
Review, Vol. 52, 295-307.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal (2011). Retrieved from
http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/Population%20projection%2020112031/PopulationProjection2011-2031.pdf.
Chapagain, K., and Yardley, J. (2012). Legislature in Nepal Disbands in Failure. The New York
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com.
Charney, C. (1999, May 28). “Civil Society, Political Violence, and Democratic Transitions:
Business and the Peace Process in South Africa, 1990 to 1994.” Comparative Studies in Society
and History, Vol. 41(1), 182-206.
Chhoden (2009). “An Evaluation of Decentralization System in Bhutan.” KDI School of Public
Policy and Management, 1-118.
CIA World Factbook. Bhutan. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/.
CIA World Factbook. Nepal. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/.
Collier, P. (2009). Wars, Guns and votes. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Dahl, R., A., Shapiro, I., & Cheirub, J., A. (2013). The Democracy Source Book. The MIT Press.

82

Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. The John Hopkins
University Press.
Diamond, L. (2009). “The Shape of Global Democracy.” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 15
(2), 77-86.
Donnell, G., O., & Schmitter, P., C. (1993). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (4th Impression). The John Hopkins University Press.
Election Commission of Bhutan (2006-2011). “Statistical Information on Elections in Bhutan
(2006-2011).” Retrieved from http://www.ecb.bt/rnp/election.pdf.
Embassy of India: Bhutan (2017). India-Bhutan Relations. Retrieve from
https://www.indianembassythimphu.bt/adminpart/uploadpdf/76237bilateral%20brief%20septem
ber%202017%20for%20website.pdf.
Freedom House (2008). Freedom in the World. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2008.
Freedom House (2011). Freedom in the World. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2011.
Freedom House (2017). Freedom in the World. Retrieved from
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
Gellner, D., N. (2007). “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal.” Economic and Political Weekly,
42:20, 823-1828.
Gellner, E. (1997). Nationalism. Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Gurung, H. (2005, January). Social exclusion and Maoist insurgency. In National Dialogue
Conference on ILO Convention (Vol. 169, pp. 19-20).
Gyeltshen, K. and Sripokangkul, S. (2017). “Bhutan’s Unique Transition to Democracy and its
Challenges.” Journal of MCU Peace Studies, 5:1, 281-296.
Haviland, C. (2015). Why is Nepal’s new constitution controversial? BBC. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34280015.
Hoglund, K. (2009). “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and
Consequences.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 21, 412–427.
Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D., and Stephens, J., D. (1993). “The Impact of Economic Development
on Democracy.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7:3, 71-86.
Human Development Reports (2008). Bhutan. Retrieved from
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BTN.
83

Human Development Reports (2008). Nepal. Retrieved from
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NPL.
Human Rights Watch (2015). Nepal: Investigate Deaths During Terai Protests. Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/16/nepal-investigate-deaths-during-terai-protests.
Huntington, S., P. (1991). “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy, 2:2, 12-34.
Hutt, M. (1996). “Ethnic Nationalism, Refuges and Bhutan.” Journal of Refugee Studies 9:4, 397420.
Jha, H. B. (2016). Nepal-India Relations Gaining Ground. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 11:2,
101-106.
Jha, H., B. (2014). “Nepal’s New Tryst with Democracy and the “India Factor.” Claws Journal,
43-58.
Jones, P. and Langford, M. (2011). “Between Demos and Ethnos: The Nepal Constitution and
Indigenous Rights.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 18:3, 369-386.
Joshua project (2018). “Musahars (Hindu traditions)
https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/17711/NP.

in

Nepal.”

Retrieved

from

Kantha, P. K. (2008). “Nepal's Protracted Democratization in Terms of Modes of Transition.”
Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: 28:1, Article 5, 59 –
70.
Kantha, P. K. (2013). “Nepal and Bhutan in 2012: Uncertain Democratic Consolidation.” Asian
Survey, 53:1, 84-92.
Kantha, P. K. “Nepal’s Protracted Transition: Explaining the Continuing Political and Economic
Impasse.” The Political Economy of Conflict in South Asia, 75-92.
Kathmandu Tribune (2017, August 18). “China offers aid to Nepal, unsettling India’s attempt to
woo back old ally.” Kathmandu Tribune. Retrieved from https://kathmandutribune.com/chinaoffers-aid-nepal-unsettling-indias-attempt-woo-back-old-ally/.
Kuensel (2015, September 27). “What is in a name?” Retrieved from
http://www.kuenselonline.com/what-is-in-a-name-2/.
Lim. T., C (2010). An Introduction to Approaches and Issues (2nd Edition). Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Lipset, S., M. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53:1, 69-105.

84

Llunji, V. (2014). “Effects of Nationalism in Countries in Transition: Attitudes toward Nationalism
in Political Culture.” Thesis, no. 1, 47-60.
Majumder, S. (2015, September 22). “Why India is concerned about Nepal’s constitution.” British
Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india34313280.
Mansfield, E., D & Snyder, J. (2009). “Pathways to War in Democratic Transitions.” International
Organization, 63, 381–90.
Mathou, T. (2009). “The Politics of Bhutan: Change in Continuity.” Journal of Bhutan Studies,
250-262.
Ministry of External Affairs: India (2012). India-Bhutan Relations. Retrieved from
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bhutan-February-2012.pdf.
Ministry of External Affairs: India (2017). India-Bhutan Relations. Retrieved from
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bhutan_September_2017_en.pdf.
Ministry
of
Finance:
Nepal.
Economic
survey
(2011).
Retrieved
http://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/Economic%20Survey%20201112_20141224054554.pdf.

from

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Bhutan (2017). Bilateral Relations. Retrieve from
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/india_in_its_nepali_backyard_0http://www.mfa.gov.bt/?
page_id=59.
Mishra, R. (2004). “India’s role in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency.” Asian Survey, 44:5, 627-646.
Nayak, N., R. (2018). India’s New Gateway to Bhutan. The Diplomat. Retrieved from
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/indias-new-gateway-to-bhutan/.
Nepal Federalism Debate. (2014). Most Common Nepali surnames. Retrieved from
https://nepalfederalismdebate.wordpress.com/2014/06/12/most-common-nepali-surnames/.
Osmani, S., R. and Bajracharya, B., B (2007). “The economic development of Nepal: a long-term
perspective,” 1-34.
Parajulee, R. P. (2000). The Democratic Transition in Nepal. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Parakh, R. (2015). “A brief timeline on Nepal’s political history with an analysis of its
constitution.” The Logical Indian. Retrieved from https://thelogicalindian.com/news/a-brief-onnepals-political-history-with-an-analysis-of-its-constitution/.
Pevehouse, J., C. (2002). “Democracy from the outside-in? International organizations and
Democratization.” International organization, 56:3, 515-549.
85

Phuntsho, K. (2004). “Echoes of Ancient Ethos: reflections on some popular Bhutanese social
themes.” [Reprinted in The Spider and the Piglet: Proceedings of the First Seminar on Bhutan
Studies.
Centre
for
Bhutan
Studies],
564-580,
Retrieved
from
http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/publicationFiles/ConferenceProceedings/SpiderAndPiglet/23Spdr%26Pglt.pdf.
Phuntsho, K. (2008, April). “Bhutan’s Unique Democracy: A First Verdict.” Retrieved from
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/institutions/bhutan_s_unique_democracy_a_first_verdict
.
Prasad, U., S. (2015). “Study of Nepal’s Economic Relations with China.” The Journal of
Development and Administrative Studies, 23(1-2), 23-32.
Reuters (2007, July 26). “Bhutan’s PM resigns ahead of first national poll.” Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com.
Reuters (2008, January 20). “Series of bomb blasts rock Bhutan, one hurt.” Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com.
Reuters (2008, May 28). “Timeline: Milestones in political history of Nepal.” Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com.
Rizal, D. (2015). The Royal Semi-Authoritarian Democracy of Bhutan. Lexington Books.
Roberts, D. (2002). “Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia, 1991 – 1999.”
Critical Asian Studies, 34:4, 520-538.
Rousseau, J., J. (1762). The Social Contract. [Translated by G. D. H. Cole, public domain].
Retrieved from https://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Rousseau_contrat-social.pdf.
Rustow, D., A (1970). “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative
Politics 2:3, 337-63.
Saklani, U., and Tortajada, C. (2016). The China factor in India-Bhutan relations. East Asia Forum.
Retrieved from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/15/the-china-factor-in-india-bhutanrelations/.
Saul, B. (2000). “Cultural Nationalism, Self-Determination and Human Rights in Bhutan.”
International Journal of Refugee Law, 12(3), 321-353.
Savada, A., N. (1993). Nepal and Bhutan country studies: Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data.
Schneider, B., R. (2001). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin-America and Southern
Europe [Review of the book Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin-America and Southern
Europe, by Burton, M, Gunther, R, and Higley, J]. Latin American Research Review, 215 – 234.
86

Schumpeter, J., A. (1976). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd.
Shah, F. (2016, February 25). Nepal’s Balancing Act. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-25/nepals-balancing-act.
Sharma, B. (2007). “Ethnic Nationalism and the Future of Nepal.” Proceedings of Unfolding
Futures: Nepalese Economy, Society, and Politics. Retrieved from http://cffn.ca/2007/10/ethnicnationalism-and-the-future-of-nepal/.
Sharma, S., K. (2016). “Nepal’s Democratic Polity and India.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal
11(2), 114-118.
Sherpa, S. (2013). “Bhutan: Between two giants.” World Policy Journal, 30(4), 41-44.
Shrestha, B., G. (2008). Ethnic nationalism in Nepal and the Newars. Continuous Politics and
Democratization in Nepal, 199-225.
Snyder, J. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Stobdan, P. (2017). “India’s real problem lies in its Bhutan policy, not the border.” The Wire.
Retrieved from https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-china-doklam-real-problem-bhutan.
Thapa, M. (2008). “India in its Nepali Backyard.” Open Democracy. Retrieved from
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/india_in_its_nepali_backyard_0.
Thapliyal, S. (2013). India’s Security Arrangements with Nepal. India: Jawaharlal Nehru
University.
The Carter Center (2009). Observing the 2008 Nepal Constituent Assembly Election. Retrieved
from https://www.cartercenter.org.
The Carter Center (2014). Political Transition Monitoring in Nepal, 2009-2014. Retrieved from
https://www.cartercenter.org.
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007). Retrieved from
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/np/np006en.pdf.
The Nepal Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA) (2016). “Social Analysis,” World
Bank, 1- 116, Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALANALYSIS/11048941115795935771/20938891/Nepal_Gender_and_Social_Exclusion.pdf.
Turner, M. (2015). Democracy still taking root in Bhutan. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/07/18/democracy-still-taking-root-in-bhutan/.

87

Turner, M., Chuki, S., & Tshering, J. (2014). “Is Democracy Being Consolidated in Bhutan?”
Asian Politics & Policy, 6:3, 413-431.
Turner, M., Chuki, S., and Tshering, J. (2011). “Democratization by decree: the case of Bhutan.”
Democratization, 1:1, 184-210.
UNICEF (2008). Bhutan. Retrieved from
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bhutan_statistics.html.
UNICEF (2008). Nepal. Retrieved from
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nepal_statistics.html.
Ura, K., Alkire, S., Zangmo, T., and Wangdi, K. (2012). The short guide to Gross National
Happiness Index. Thimphu: The Centre for Bhutan Studies.
Vivek, V. (2017, April 25). “India gives most foreign aid to Bhutan, not its new priorities
Afghanistan and Africa.” Scroll.in. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/article/835481/india-givesmost-foreign-aid-to-bhutan-not-its-new-priorities-afghanistan-and-africa.
Webster, W., T. (1995). “The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law
Analysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches,” Georgetown Journal of International Law, 445521.
Wolf, S., O. (2016, February 24). “Betwixt and Between: Bhutan’s Royal Way to Democracy and
Upcoming Challenges.” E-International Relations. Retrieved from https://www.eir.info/2016/02/24/betwixt-and-between-bhutans-royal-way-to-democracy-and-upcomingchallenges/.
World Bank (2008). Bhutan. Retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/country/bhutan?view=chart.
World Bank (2008). Nepal. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/nepal?view=chart.
Yetsho, T. (2010). Memories of Agrarian Reform in Bhutan: An Exploratory study based on oral
history. International Institute of Social Studies. 1-41.

88

